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Abstract: As the ﬁrst, substantive contribution, this paper revisits the eﬀective-
ness of two widely used public sponsored training programs, the ﬁrst one focusing on
intensive occupational training and the second one on short-term activation and job
entry. We use an exceptionally rich administrative data set for Germany to estimate
their employment and earnings eﬀects in the early 2000s. We employ a stratiﬁed
propensity score matching approach to address dynamic selection into heteroge-
neous programs. As a second, methodological contribution, we carefully assess to
what extent various aspects of our empirical strategy such as conditioning ﬂexibly
on employment and beneﬁt histories, the availability of rich personal information,
handling of later program participations, and further methodological and speciﬁca-
tion choices aﬀect estimation results. Our results imply pronounced negative lock-in
eﬀects in the short run in general and positive medium-run eﬀects on employment
and earnings when job-seekers enroll after having been unemployed for some time.
We ﬁnd that data and speciﬁcation issues can have a large eﬀect on impact esti-
mates.
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1 Introduction
There has been an enormous interest in the evaluation of active labor market policies
in general, and of public sponsored training in particular, both in the US and Eu-
rope.1 While earlier studies typically focused on the evaluation of a single program,
recent developments in methodology and data access allow researchers to study
the heterogeneity of treatment eﬀects across diﬀerent subgroups of people and the
comparative eﬀects of narrowly deﬁned subprograms.2 Detailed information on em-
ployment and earnings histories prior to program participation seems important to
justify matching estimators for treatment eﬀects that rely on a selection on observ-
ables assumption.3 Accurate longitudinal information on labor market transitions
is also useful to account for the dynamics of program assignment and to carefully
align treated and comparison units in their elapsed unemployment experience.4
While methodological progress is likely to improve the policy relevance of scientiﬁc
evaluations, it dramatically increases the range of possible choices researchers can
make. A better understanding of how training programs work and to what extent
evaluation results hinge on particular data features and methodological choices is
crucial to assess research ﬁndings based on diﬀerent empirical strategies and data
sets. This paper makes two contributions. On the substantive side, we revisit the
eﬀectiveness of two widely used public sponsored training programs – the ﬁrst one
involving comprehensive classroom further training and the second one focusing
on short-term activation and reemployment – using a dynamic propensity score
matching approach. On the methodological side, we undertake a detailed sensitivity
analysis to investigate the importance of data features and speciﬁcation choices as
well as econometric modeling strategies in shaping estimation results.
Our ﬁrst methodological contribution relates to the availability of rich data. We
have access to unique data for Germany that merges information from diﬀerent ad-
ministrative registers. They contain precise and extensive information on individual
1For comprehensive overviews see Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999), Martin (2000), Martin
and Grubb (2001), Kluve and Schmidt (2002), Carcillo and Grubb (2006), and Card, Kluve and
Weber (2010).
2Examples of evaluations involving multiple comparisons of diﬀerent programs are Lechner
(2002), Gerﬁn and Lechner (2002), Larsson (2003), Hardoy (2005), Dyke et al. (2006), Dorsett
(2006), Frölich (2008), and Sianesi (2008).
3See, e.g., Dolton and Smith (2011), Heckman et al. (1998), Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith
(1999), Heckman and Smith (1999)).
4See, e.g., Crépon et al. (2009), Fredriksson and Johansson (2008), Lechner (1999), Osikominu
(2012), Sianesi (2004).
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employment and beneﬁt histories covering more than ten years before and about
2.5 years after treatment start, detailed information on participation in all active
labor market programs as well as detailed proﬁles of job-seekers (i.e. personal char-
acteristics and goals of job search) that are reported by the caseworkers at the local
employment agencies. Using diﬀerent balancing tests, we ﬁrst show that the infor-
mation on personal characteristics and individual employment and beneﬁt histories
in our data balances individual characteristics and pre-treatment outcomes in our
treatment and comparison groups well. We then carry out a careful sensitivity anal-
ysis that compares our benchmark evaluation results to diﬀerent variations in which
we omit important aspects of our data or our speciﬁcations. We believe that such
an analysis provides important information for the evaluation of labor market pro-
grams in other countries. For example, many data sets used for evaluation purposes
lack the information about what other programs comparison group members might
participate in, e.g. that of Mueser, Troske, and Gorislavsky (2007). We investigate
the sensitivity of the results if we proceed as if we did not have this information.
Similarly, in the spirit of Card and Sullivan (1988), Dolton and Smith (2011), and
Heckman and Smith (1999), we examine what diﬀerence conditioning on various
aspects of the employment and beneﬁt history makes. In order to assess to what
extent evaluation results hinge on the availability of rich personal information, we
compare our results to several speciﬁcations in which we omit information e.g. about
the motivation of participants or on health and other characteristics which are often
not available in data sets used for evaluation purposes.5
Our second methodological contribution relates to the implementation of a match-
ing approach under dynamic treatment assignment. People who become unemployed
may at some later point take up a job, participate in one of the training programs
under investigation or in some other labor market program. According to many
labor market policy regulations, as is the case also in Germany, these three options
are to be viewed as competing risks. In particular, somebody who has found em-
ployment again is not eligible for program participation anymore. In this setting,
a simple static evaluation approach in which unemployed receiving treatment are
compared to unemployed who never receive treatment is not feasible. Deﬁning non-
5Complementary to our ﬁrst methodological contribution, Lechner and Wunsch (2011) examine
the importance of diﬀerent sets of conditioning variables using the same administrative data and
propensity score matching in combination with matching on actual and hypothetical program
starts. Their study involves an Empirical Monte Carlo analysis that presumes a known data
generating process using real data and the validity of the conditional independence assumption.
Our analysis, in contrast, investigates the sensitivity of the estimated treatment eﬀects. In another
Empirical Monte Carlo analysis, Huber, Lechner, and Wunsch (2010) investigate the performance
of diﬀerent propensity score matching estimators.
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participants as never participants implies conditioning on future outcomes because
for these persons the exit to employment has occurred before the potential start of
treatment (Fredriksson and Johansson (2008)). Put diﬀerently, excluding compar-
ison individuals who receive treatment in the future excludes possible sequences of
events which may have occurred under the counterfactual situation that a treated
individual had not started the program at the particular point of time observed.
Similarly, we may only observe a treatment starting at some point of time during
an unemployment spell because the unemployed did not happen to ﬁnd a job be-
fore. Following Sianesi (2004), we deﬁne treatment parameters conditional on the
unemployment experience at the time of treatment start and include all those in the
comparison group for a particular treatment start who do not enroll at the elapsed
unemployment experience under consideration. As a consequence, the future out-
comes of comparison units may be aﬀected by the eﬀect of the treatment. In our
sensitivity analysis we investigate the sensitivity of the estimated treatment eﬀects
to not using the information on future program participation and on participation in
other labor market programs as well as to not aligning treated and comparison per-
sons by elapsed unemployment duration. We further compare the results obtained
in our benchmark approach to an alternative approach suggested by Lechner (1999).
The latter assigns to each nontreated individual who does not receive the treatment
of interest within a ﬁxed time window of e.g. twelve months a hypothetical program
start date that is simulated based on covariates observed at the start of the unem-
ployment spell. A nontreated individual is then only used as comparison if he/she
is still unemployed before the hypothetical starting date. In an attempt to align
treated and comparison units in their prior unemployment experience, similarity of
the actual and hypothetical program start dates is introduced as a further match-
ing requirement. Our second methodological sensitivity analysis thus provides new
insights on the importance of econometric modeling choices to control for dynamic
selection eﬀects.
Finally, as our substantive contribution, we assess the eﬀectiveness of the two train-
ing programs during a time when resources were shifted away from longer-term
training programs to short-term programs and to more job oriented programs (see
Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2005c), and ﬁgure 1 below). Given the wide range of
training programs implemented in Germany, our comparison of diﬀerent forms of
training may also hold lessons for other countries that employ similar programs.
Short-term training is particularly interesting because, in addition to the provision
of skills, it includes elements of job search assistance as well as proﬁling and moni-
toring of the unemployed (see the literature on such programs reviewed in the next
3
section). Our results show sizeable lock-in eﬀects for all programs in the short run.
In the medium-run, we ﬁnd positive eﬀects on employment and earnings when job-
seekers enroll after having been unemployed for some time. Although both types of
training programs generate signiﬁcant earnings gains in the cases in which there are
also positive employment eﬀects, earnings gains induced by classroom further train-
ing attain e200 per month and are generally larger than those of short-term training
(e70 per month for men and e175 for women). We ﬁnd little evidence for addi-
tional impact heterogeneity after stratifying by gender and elapsed unemployment
duration.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the training liter-
ature. Section 3 describes the institutional background and data. We introduce our
econometric approach in Section 4. The evaluation results and our sensitivity anal-
ysis are presented in Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes. The Online-Appendix
provides complementary empirical results and background information.
2 Review of the Training Literature
The earlier literature for the US (see the reviews by Barnow (1987) Bloom et al.
(1997) or Heckman et al. (1999)) distinguishes classroom training, on-the-job train-
ing, and work experience. Programs tend to be more eﬀective for women than
for men and on-the-job training tends to be more eﬀective than classroom training
and work experience. More recent evaluations for the US make use of advances
in econometric methods, often investigate impacts over a longer time period, and
put a stronger emphasis on the heterogeneous eﬀects of diﬀerent training programs
(Dyke et al. (2006), Hotz, Imbens, and Klerman (2006), Heinrich et al. (2010)).
These studies investigate programs involving job search assistance, improvement in
job readiness, or training and they compare longer to shorter programs. Dyke et
al. (2006) and Hotz et al. (2006) analyze training programs for a speciﬁc group of
welfare recipients, whereas our study concerns training among a sample of prime-
age unemployed who were employed in the recent past. Heinrich et al. (2010) ﬁnd
positive medium-run to long-run eﬀects for the broader group of participants in pro-
grams under the Workforce Investment Act. Their ﬁndings imply higher gains for
participants in general programs for adults than for participants from the group of
displaced workers.
In a study for Canada, Park et al. (1996) distinguish training programs for the long-
term unemployed, re-entry programs for women, and programs addressing speciﬁc
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skill shortages. The study ﬁnds that only the latter two involve positive earnings
eﬀects. Hui and Smith (2003a, b) distinguish training programs by the source of
ﬁnancing (private, public, employer). The study concludes that the quality of their
data is not suﬃcient to provide credible estimates. For the UK, Dorsett (2006)
analyzes the relative eﬀectiveness of the ﬁve options oﬀered under the New Deal for
Young People. The ﬁve options are remaining on the gateway of intensive job search,
subsidized full time employment, full-time education or training, work placement in
a voluntary sector, and placement in the so-called Environmental Task Force. In
most cases, entering one of the other options was not found to be more eﬀective
than intensive job search.
As one of the ﬁrst studies providing a pairwise evaluation of multiple, mutually ex-
clusive treatments (Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001)), Gerﬁn and Lechner (2002)
analyze the comparative eﬀectiveness of ﬁve types of public sponsored training pro-
grams in Switzerland with durations ranging between 5 and 13 weeks using high
quality administrative data. The study ﬁnds that, one year after program start, the
employment rate of participants is lower than that of comparable non-participants.
Longer, more intensive training programs show less negative eﬀects than shorter
ones.
For the Nordic countries, a number of studies investigate the eﬀects of public spon-
sored training programs, often based on high quality administrative data. Larsson
(2003) ﬁnds zero or even negative eﬀects of two youth labor market programs in
Sweden, a subsidized work program and a training program, compared to no treat-
ment. Sianesi (2008) analyzes the comparative eﬀectiveness of diﬀerent labor mar-
ket programs in Sweden, among them vocational classroom training, work practice
(subsidized employment including elements of training), and trainee replacement
(training on-the-job mostly in the public sector). She ﬁnds moderate positive eﬀects
for trainee placement but no positive eﬀects for other forms of training. For Norway,
Hardoy (2005) and Jespersen, Munch, and Skipper (2008) ﬁnd negative eﬀects of
classroom training. The evidence on more practically oriented training is mixed.
A number of studies use high quality administrative data for Germany during the
1990s with an evaluation period after program start of up to eight years. Lech-
ner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2007, 2011) distinguish between medium-term programs
(mean duration 4 months), longer programs (mean duration 9 to 12 months) and
long programs with speciﬁc contents. Most of the programs show positive eﬀects
in the long run, even in East Germany. An important ﬁnding is that medium-term
programs outperform longer programs as they exhibit a much shorter lock-in period
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with otherwise similar employment eﬀects after the end of the program. Similar
ﬁndings are obtained by Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2007), Fitzenberger and Völ-
ter (2007), and Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Völter (2008) based on the same data
but using a diﬀerent methodological approach building on Sianesi (2004).
The administrative data for Germany during the 1990s are yet still much less infor-
mative than the administrative data used in this study for the 2000s. For instance,
the data for the 1990s only contain information on periods with unemployment ben-
eﬁts but not about being registered as unemployed. Furthermore, the older data
involve less rich information on personal characteristics and no information about
other active labor market programs apart from training. As to be expected from
the evidence reported in Sianesi (2008) for Sweden, a country with a comprehensive
set of active labor market policies like Germany, information about other programs
is important, as our analysis will show. Our data set is not unmatched in terms
of informational content compared to data sets used for the evaluation of public
sponsored training programs in other countries. Our impression is that there are
administrative data sets available for the Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, and
Austria, which are more or less just as rich in informational content as the recent ad-
ministrative data for Germany. In contrast, the data sets used for the US, Canada,
UK, and most other countries seem typically much less informative in comparison.
A further drawback of the studies for Germany for the 1990s is that they do not
analyze short-term training programs which were abolished in 1993.6 Since their
reintroduction in 1998, short-term training programs (‘Trainingsmaßnahmen’) have
by now become the most important active labor market program regarding the
number of participants (see Section 3.1). Evaluations for other countries (Blundell,
Costa Dias, and van Reenen (2004), Weber and Hofer (2004), Fougère, Pradel, and
Roger (2005), Crépon, Dejemeppe, and Gurgand (2005), van den Berg and van der
Klaauw (2006)) and policy discussions (Martin and Grubb (2001), OECD (2005))
suggest that short-term training programs are superior to longer training programs
because the former activate the unemployed without a long lock-in eﬀect. Job
search assistance may be an inexpensive way to increase the employment chances of
job-seekers. Using data for the 2000s, Hujer, Thomsen, and Zeiss (2006) ﬁnd that
participation in short-term training reduces the unemployment duration of West
German job-seekers.
6An exception is Fitzenberger et al. (2012) who compare the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of short-
term training for the 1980s, the early 1990s, and the early 2000s and which ﬁnds modest positive
employment eﬀects in some but not all cases.
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The studies mentioned so far for Germany do not compare short-term training to
other programs. Using the data for the 2000s, Schneider et al. (2006) ﬁnd that
shorter training programs, which are longer than short-term training programs,
tend to be more eﬀective than longer ones. Osikominu (2012) uses the same ad-
ministrative data as this paper but a duration framework in continuous time. She
ﬁnds that short-term training reduces the remaining time in unemployment and
has moderate positive eﬀects on subsequent job stability. Longer training programs
initially prolong the remaining time in unemployment but former participants have
substantially more stable employment spells and earn more. Also using the same
administrative data as we do, Wunsch and Lechner (2008) and Lechner and Wunsch
(2009) estimate diﬀerential eﬀects of various programs including short-term train-
ing.7 For West Germany, partly in contrast to our results in this study, Wunsch and
Lechner (2008) ﬁnd negative lock-in eﬀects for all programs in the short run and no
– or even negative – medium-run eﬀects on employment and earnings. We take the
diﬀerences to our study as a motivation to analyze the sensitivity of results with
regard to methodological choices. We note here three important methodological
aspects of the study Wunsch and Lechner (2008).8 First, the comparison group is
deﬁned based on nonparticipation during an observation window of 18 months (in
an additional sensitivity analysis, a time window of 12 months is used). Second,
Wunsch and Lechner (2008) simulate hypothetical program start dates for controls
and use these dates for the alignment of treated and controls in time. This pre-
sumes matching on the duration until treatment, which is unknown for the controls.
Third, in addition to the start dates of the program, Wunsch and Lechner (2008)
match on an estimated propensity score that does not change over the course of the
unemployment spell.
3 Background and Data
3.1 Training as Part of Active Labor Market Policy
The main goal of German active labor market policy is to permanently reintegrate
unemployed individuals (and individuals who are at risk of becoming unemployed)
7Similar to Lechner and Wunsch (2009), Biewen et al. (2007) do not ﬁnd signiﬁcantly positive
employment eﬀects for East Germany.
8Another diﬀerence between the evaluation sample in Wunsch and Lechner (2008) and ours is
that they do not include programs ﬁnanced under the heading ‘Freie Förderung’ and by the ESF
(European Social Fund). Further, they restrict the analysis to workers who receive unemployment
assistance or unemployment beneﬁts.
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back into employment. There exists a wide range of diﬀerent programs such as
wage subsidies, job creation schemes, youth programs, programs to promote self-
employment, and training programs, see ﬁgure 1 for an overview. Training programs
have traditionally been the most important part of active labor market policy. This
paper focuses on training programs during the time period 2000 and 2002.9
— Figure 1 about here —
There are three main types of training: short-term training (Trainingsmaßnahmen),
further training (Beruﬂiche Weiterbildung), and retraining (Umschulung).10 Apart
from the fact that all three types of training require full-time participation, they
diﬀer considerably in length and content.
Short-term training programs last only two to twelve weeks (the mean duration is
slightly over four weeks, table 1) and typically have one or several of the following
three goals. A ﬁrst goal is to assess job seekers’ labor market opportunities and their
suitability for diﬀerent jobs. This may also entail proﬁling and developing a strategy
to ﬁnd a job. A second goal is to test the job seeker’s willingness to work and to
improve job search skills. This may involve job-application training. The third goal
is the provision of speciﬁc skills that are necessary to improve the job seeker’s labor
market prospects, e.g. through computer courses or commercial training. In 2001,
about a ﬁfth of short-term training programs focus on the ﬁrst and second goal,
respectively, and 28% on the third. 31% serve more than one of these goals (Kurtz
(2003)).
— Table 1 here —
The more substantial further training programs typically last between several
months and one year, thus representing medium-term programs. Their goal is to
maintain, update, adjust, and extend professional skills. The programs cover a wide
range of ﬁelds and may also comprise practical elements such as on-the-job training
or working in practice ﬁrms. Typical examples include training on marketing and
sales strategies, computer assisted bookkeeping, operating construction machines,
and specialist courses in speciﬁc legal ﬁelds. Depending on their practical content
9We focus on the period before the Hartz-Reforms were implemented that changed some of the
rules on training programs (Schneider et al. (2006)).
10In addition, there are speciﬁc training programs for disadvantaged youths and disabled persons
as well as German language courses.
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we distinguish between classroom further training and practical further training. Fi-
nally, retraining programs involve training on a new vocational degree according to
the German system of vocational education. They last two to three years.
Eligibility for one of the training programs requires the registration as a job-seeker
at the local labor oﬃce. This involves a counseling interview with the caseworker.
For participation in the longer further training and retraining programs, individ-
uals also have to fulﬁl a minimum work requirement of one year and they must
be entitled to unemployment beneﬁts. However, there are a number of exceptions.
The binding criterion is that the training program has to be considered necessary
in order for the job-seeker to take up a job, e.g. because the training is required
to meet the hiring standards of the job. Training programs are usually assigned
by the caseworker, depending on the regional supply of upcoming training slots. A
participation in training may take place at any point in time during the unemploy-
ment spell. Job-seekers have no entitlements regarding participation. A program
assignment is compulsory for the job-seeker and noncompliance may entail beneﬁt
sanctions and the exclusion from further services. The employment agency covers
all direct training costs. In addition, participants in short-term training may con-
tinue to receive unemployment beneﬁts or means-tested unemployment assistance,
if eligible. Participants in further training and retraining usually receive a subsis-
tence allowance of the same amount as unemployment beneﬁts or unemployment
assistance, provided they fulﬁll the minimum work requirement.
Table 1 shows that the average monthly training costs per participant are lower
for short-term training courses (e570 in 2001) than for the medium- and long-term
programs (e664). Given that the average length of short-term training is only 1.1
months while that of the longer programs is 9.3 months, this results in ten times
higher costs for the medium- and long-term programs as opposed to short-term
training (e6,175 vs 627). In light of their substantially lower costs, participation in
short-term training programs has been expanded since 2002 compared to longer-term
programs (ﬁgure 1). Short-term training has become the largest training program
regarding the number of participants. These stark diﬀerences in costs and durations
motivate our comparison of the two types of training programs.
3.2 Administrative Database Used
Our study uses a new and exceptionally rich administrative database, the Integrated
Employment Biographies Sample (IEBS) provided by the Research Data Center of
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the Federal Employment Agency.11 The IEBS is a 2.2% random sample from a
data ﬁle combining individual records out of four diﬀerent administrative registers,
i.e. (i) the Employment History (Beschäftigten-Historik), (ii) the Benefit Recipient
History (Leistungsempfänger-Historik), (iii) the Database of Registered Job-Seekers
(Bewerberangebot), and (iv) the Database of Program Participants (Maßnahme-
Teilnehmer-Gesamtdatenbank). Start and end dates of the diﬀerent labor market
episodes are measured with daily precision. In addition to individual labor market
histories, the IEBS contains extensive information on personal characteristics, oc-
cupation and job characteristics as well as regional identiﬁers, which allows us to
merge e.g. the unemployment rate at the county level.12 For evaluation purposes, a
rich set of covariates is essential to reconstruct the circumstances aﬀecting program
participation and labor market outcomes.
The Employment History involves register data for the time period January 1990 to
December 2004 on employment subject to social security contributions.13 Earnings
before taxes are collected on an annual basis in a given employment relationship
if no changes in relevant information, such as a change of the health insurance,
occur within the year. Speciﬁcally, for somebody continuously working with a given
employer we observe a spell that lasts from January 1st to December 31 of each year
together with total earnings during each spell. This allows us to calculate earnings
per calendar day as well as over more aggregated time intervals. We use these data
to construct variables that reﬂect the employment status and wages during the pre-
and post-treatment periods, spanning about ten years in total. We only consider
unsubsidized employment spells for our outcome measures. In addition, we use
information on year of birth, gender, occupation and industry.
The Benefit Recipient History includes spells of all unemployment beneﬁt, unem-
ployment assistance, and subsistence allowance payments between January 1990 and
June 2005 together with some personal characteristics. The Beneﬁt Recipient His-
tory provides information on periods during which people are not employed and
therefore not covered by the Employment History. We use the information on ben-
eﬁt payments to construct individual beneﬁt histories dating back for seven years.
Moreover, we use information on reasons for suspensions of payments to proxy a
11See Jacobebbinghaus and Seth (2007) and http://fdz.iab.de/en.aspx. Being among the
ﬁrst to use the IEBS, we performed extensive consistency checks, see Bender et al. (2004, 2005),
Fitzenberger, Osikominu and Völter (2006), and Waller (2008).
12Counties do not necessarily coincide with local labor markets. Nevertheless, the county level
unemployment rate is a good proxy for the local labor market conditions.
13This is equivalent to about 80% of the employed persons (Bender, Haas, and Klose (2000)).
The main groups not covered are the self-employed and civil servants.
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lack of motivation to ﬁnd a job.
The Database of Registered Job-Seekers contains information on job search dur-
ing the time period January 1997 to June 2005.14 First, the data source provides
additional information about the labor market status of a person, i.e. whether some-
body is looking for a job while employed or nonemployed or whether somebody is
temporarily sick while being registered as unemployed. Second, it includes rich in-
formation about personal characteristics, e.g. educational attainment, nationality,
family situation, health status, characteristics of the last job as well as goals of job
search.
The Database of Program Participants contains detailed information on participation
in all public sponsored labor market programs (5-digit program codes) as well as
some additional variables such as the planned end date. This register covers the
time period January 2000 to July 2005. We use the information on participation in
job creation schemes and wage subsidy programs to identify subsidized employment
spells in the Employment History.
3.3 Evaluation Sample and Training Programs Analyzed
Our evaluation approach involves comparisons between a group of people receiving
a program of interest and a group of people who do not receive the program but
could do so in principle. Correspondingly, one has to determine ﬁrst who is a
potential program participant. We focus on individuals who become unemployed
after having been continuously employed for a while, instead of a stock sample of
observed unemployed at a given point of time. This way, we exclude those individuals
who have been out of the labor force and who register as unemployed just because
they want to participate in a training program. In interviews, caseworkers told
us that especially women returning from maternity leave, divorcees, or university
graduates who have diﬃculties ﬁnding a job contact the local employment oﬃce
inquiring about the possibility to participate in programs. Thus, an evaluation
sample based on the observed unemployment status at a particular point in time
(instead of an inﬂow sample from employment into unemployment) has important
disadvantages. Since participants returning from out of the labor force are not
registered as unemployed before the start of training, the corresponding comparison
persons, who are still out of the labor force, are not recorded in the data. Even if it
14According to the data manual for the IEBS, the Database of Registered Job-Seekers is complete
only from 2000 onwards. However, this does not seem to be an issue for our analysis as the share
of missings in our retrospective variables does not vary systematically over time.
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were possible to observe these people in the data, this would entail the danger that
these individuals are not considering to take up a job, which is the main purpose of
active labor market programs. Therefore, we focus on individuals who are attached
to the labor market because they were employed in the recent past. This enables
us to construct a suitable comparison group based on the information in the data.
Furthermore, the beginning of the unemployment spell deﬁnes a natural time scale
to align treated and nontreated individuals.
Our sample of inﬂows into unemployment comprises West Germans who become
unemployed between the beginning of February 2000 and the end of January 2002,
after having been continuously employed for at least three months. Entering unem-
ployment is deﬁned as ending regular, non-subsidized full-time or part-time employ-
ment, and subsequently being in contact with the employment oﬃce (not necessarily
immediately) as reﬂected by a job search spell, beneﬁt receipt, or program partici-
pation.15 In order to exclude individuals eligible for speciﬁc youth programs or for
early retirement schemes, we only consider persons aged between 25 and 53 years
at the beginning of their unemployment spell. Our evaluation focuses on the ﬁrst
training program that is attended in the course of a given unemployment spell.
— Table 2 here —
We report results for two diﬀerent types of training that largely follow the legal
grouping of program types: short-term training (STT) and classroom further train-
ing (CFT), see Section 3.1.16 In a few cases, we also included programs with similar
contents and planned durations but somewhat diﬀerent legal basis into our program
types.17 While we display treatment eﬀects only for STT and CFT, we consider
participation in other programs, e.g. practical further training and subsidized em-
ployment, when deﬁning the comparison groups (see table 2). That is, participants
in other programs are not counted as in open unemployment. We estimate program
eﬀects separately for men and women and for three strata representing diﬀerent du-
rations of elapsed unemployment. This results in a total of six evaluation samples
(stratum 1/2/3, male/female). Table 2 gives an overview of the sample sizes and the
15About 10% of the individuals in our inﬂow sample appear with more than one unemployment
spell according to our inﬂow deﬁnition. We take account of this when calculating standard errors,
see Section 4.
16In Biewen et al. (2007), we also report results for practical further training and retraining as
well as for East Germany.
17We assigned some programs in the legal category of Discretionary Support (Freie Förderung)
and programs ﬁnanced by the European Social Fund (Europäischer Sozialfonds) into one of our
program categories.
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transitions from open unemployment. Figure 2 provides descriptive information on
the duration of diﬀerent program types. STT programs last on average about one
month. CFT programs last on average 7.5 months, with spikes in the distribution
at 6 and 12 months.
— Figure 2 here —
4 Econometric Approach
4.1 Evaluating Multiple Treatments in a Dynamic Context
Our empirical analysis is based upon the potential-outcome approach to causality
(see Neyman (1923), Roy (1951), Rubin (1974) and the survey of Heckman et al.
(1999)). Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) extend this framework to allow for mul-
tiple, exclusive treatments. Our analysis distinguishes two diﬀerent treatments, STT
and CFT, as well as a nontreatment state. Let Y k represent the potential outcome
associated with training program k = 1, 2 and Y 0 the potential outcome when not
participating in any program. For each individual, only one of the three potential
outcomes is observed. We focus on the ﬁrst treatment in a given unemployment
spell. Our goal is to estimate the average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATT)
of receiving treatment k = 1, 2 as the ﬁrst treatment both against nonparticipation
l = 0 (treatment versus ‘searching’) and against treatment l, with k 6= l and k, l 6= 0
(diﬀerential eﬀect of two programs).
In our context, participation in training is possible at any point in time during the
unemployment spell. A job-seeker who has not yet enrolled at a given point in time
may join at some later point in time provided he remains unemployed up to that
time. In such a setting, persons with longer completed unemployment durations
are more likely to end up receiving treatment than persons with shorter completed
unemployment durations. Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) show that in this case
a static evaluation analysis that assumes that the treatment is administered only
once yields biased treatment eﬀects because the deﬁnition of the comparison group
conditions on future outcomes.18 We follow the approach suggested in Sianesi (2004,
2008) to extend the static multiple treatment approach to a dynamic setting. Sianesi
focuses on the eﬀect of participating after a given unemployment experience (i.e. pe-
18While Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) then estimate the eﬀect on the hazard of leaving
unemployment, our outcome variables of interest are the monthly employment status and earnings.
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riod of eligibility) versus not participating up to that point in time and continuing to
search for a job. Thus, treatment eﬀects are deﬁned conditional on a given starting
date during the unemployment spell and the treated and comparison individuals
are aligned by the elapsed unemployment duration. Note that individuals in the
nontreatment group may enroll in training at some later point during the unem-
ployment spell. This treatment parameter (treatment versus searching) mirrors the
decision problem of the caseworker and the unemployed who recurrently during the
unemployment spell decide whether to start any of the training programs now or
to postpone possible participation to the future, in case job search will not be suc-
cessful. When discussing the policy implications of our estimates, one has to be
careful because those nontreated individuals in one stratum who receive treatment
later experience the impact of the treatment.
We distinguish between treatment starting during months 1 to 3 of the unemploy-
ment spell (stratum 1), treatment starting during months 4 to 6 (stratum 2), and
treatment starting during months 7 to 12 (stratum 3). We experimented with shorter
strata but found that the number of treated and comparison individuals became too
small (thus resulting in higher variance of the estimates) to implement our matching
approach that relies on both exact matching and kernel matching (see below). Also
due to concerns regarding small sample sizes, we do not evaluate training programs
starting more than 12 months after the beginning of unemployment.
We evaluate treatments conditional on the unemployment spell lasting at least until
the start of treatment k. Let u = 1, 2, . . . denote the month in which treatment k
starts in the unemployment spell. For instance u = 2 means that treatment starts in
month 2 of unemployment. τ = 0, 1, 2, . . ., counts the months since the beginning of
treatment k. Y k(u, τ) is then the potential outcome in period u+ τ for treatment k
starting in month u. Similarly, Y l(u˜, τ−(u˜−u)) is the alternative potential outcome
in period u˜ + (τ − (u˜ − u)) associated with the alternative treatment l starting in
period u˜. The ATT parameter for treatment k against the alternative l (k ∈ {1, 2},
l ∈ {0, 1, 2}, k 6= l) is given by
(1)
θ(k, l; u, τ) = E(Y k(u, τ)|Uo = u− 1, Tu = k)
−Eu≤u˜≤u¯s(Y
l(u˜, τ − (u˜− u))|Uo = u˜ ≥ u−1, Tu = k) ,
where Uo denotes the random time spent in open (i.e. untreated) unemployment
and Tu ∈ {0, 1, 2} the treatment status in period u. us (u¯s) denotes the start
(end) of stratum s, s ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and Eu≤u˜≤u¯s() the expectation with respect to the
distribution of u˜ in the remainder of the stratum. Thus, for treatment k starting in
period u we require that possible comparison individuals receiving treatment l have
spent the same amount of time in open unemployment as of period u−1 and receive
14
treatment l no earlier during the stratum considered than the treated individual.
For l = 0, we have u˜ = u and the comparison group comprises all individuals
whose unemployment spell lasts at least u − 1 periods and who do not participate
in any program during the stratum considered. This entails the possibility of exit
to employment before the end of the stratum. For l ≥ 1, u˜ can take any value in
the interval [u, u¯s] and τ − (u˜ − u) counts the months since start of treatment l,
thus aligning elapsed unemployment duration. This way, we compare participation
in one program to possibly delayed participation in another program later during
the stratum.
We display treatment eﬀects by stratum only, averaging the period speciﬁc treatment
eﬀects, θ(k, l; u, τ), with respect to the distribution of starting dates in the stratum:
θ(k, l; s, τ) =
∑
u
fs(u)θ(k, l; u, τ) ,
where fs(u), u ∈ {us, . . . , u¯s}, is the distribution of starting dates in stratum s.
We assume the following dynamic version of the conditional mean independence
assumption (DCIA):
(2)
Eu≤u˜≤u¯s(Y
l(u˜, τ − (u˜− u))|Uo = u˜ ≥ u−1, Tu = k,Xs) =
Eu≤u˜≤u¯s(Y
l(u˜, τ − (u˜− u))|Uo = u˜ ≥ u−1, Tu˜ = l,Xs) ,
where Xs denotes a vector of covariates that are time-invariant within a stratum.
We eﬀectively assume that, conditional on Xs and on remaining in open unem-
ployment at least until period u − 1, individuals are comparable in their outcome
for treatment l occurring in month u˜ between u and u¯s. As usual, implicit is the
assumption that potential outcomes are independent across individuals, ruling out
general equilibrium eﬀects.
4.2 Combining Exact Matching and Kernel Matching
Building on Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1983) result on the balancing property of the
propensity score in the case of a binary treatment, Lechner (2001) shows that the
conditional probability of treatment k, given that the individual receives treatment
k or treatment l, P k|kl(Xs), exhibits an analogous balancing property for the com-
parison of program k versus l. This allows us to apply standard binary propensity
score matching based on the sample of individuals participating in either program
k or l. For this subsample, we simply estimate the probability of treatment k and
then apply a bivariate extension of standard propensity score matching techniques.
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Implicitly, we assume that matching on the elapsed unemployment duration, prior
employment history and calendar time at the start of the spell accounts for any
remaining selection within the stratum.
To account for the dynamic nature of treatment assignment, we estimate the prob-
ability of receiving treatment k versus l in a given stratum using all the individuals
in group k and l who are still unemployed at the beginning of the stratum consid-
ered. For treatment during months 1 to 3, we take the total sample of unemployed,
who participate in k or l during months 1 to 3 (stratum 1), and estimate a Probit
model for participation in k. For l = 0, the comparison group includes those un-
employed who either never participate in any program or who start some treatment
after month 3 (see table 2). Similarly, for treatment during strata 2 and 3, the basic
sample consists of those individuals in group k and l who are still unemployed at
the beginning of the stratum.
We then combine kernel matching involving the propensity score with cell matching,
by imposing additional criteria along which treated and comparison observations are
aligned exactly. Speciﬁcally, we impose the following four matching requirements: (i)
similarity in the pairwise propensity score, (ii) similarity in the calendar date of the
beginning of unemployment, (iii) equality in the elapsed time in open unemployment,
and (iv) equality in the employment history before the start of unemployment. Given
exact matches for (iii) and (iv), we estimate the counterfactual employment and
earnings outcomes by means of a Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression to achieve (i)
and (ii). We use a product kernel in the estimated propensity score and the calendar
month of entry into unemployment
(3) KKj(pd, cd) = K
(
pd − pj
hp
)
· h|cd−cj |c ,
where K(z) is the Gaussian kernel function, pd and cd are the propensity score and
the calendar month of entry into unemployment of a particular treated individual d,
pj and cj are the estimated propensity score and the calendar month of entry into
unemployment of an individual j belonging to the comparison group of individuals
treated with l. The parameters hp and hc are the bandwidth (type) parameters. We
use the bivariate crossvalidation procedure suggested in Bergemann, Fitzenberger,
and Speckesser (2009) and Fitzenberger et al. (2008) to obtain the bandwidths hp
and hc by minimizing the squared prediction error of the average l-outcome for
the individuals in the l-group who are most similar to the participants in program
k.19 We obtain standard errors and pointwise conﬁdence bands for our estimated
19For the comparisons of training versus searching, the crossvalidation yields an optimum for hp
of zero, which corresponds to an exact alignment in calendar time.
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treatment parameters through bootstrapping based on 250 resamples. We resample
individuals with their entire observation vector to obtain standard errors clustered at
the individual level, thus also accounting for the multiple appearance of individuals.
The propensity score is reestimated in each resample.
Recently, there have been a number of Monte Carlo studies analyzing the perfor-
mance of various estimators for treatment eﬀects relying on propensity score match-
ing, see Busso, DiNardo, and McCrary (2009, 2011), Galdo, Smith, and Black (2008),
and Huber, et al. (2010). These studies reassess the conclusions drawn by the earlier
Monte Carlo study of Frölich (2004). The key insights from the diﬀerent studies are
the following. First, there is no estimator which performs best in all settings and
according to all criteria. Second, the popular nearest neighbor matching approach
is inferior to more involved estimators appropriately adjusted to the estimation
problem investigated. Third, optimized versions of both kernel or radius match-
ing improve upon simple implementations, unless sample sizes are really small, and
typically do not perform badly even when inverse probability weighting (IPW, the
preferred method in Busso et al. (2009, 2011)) performs better. Fourth, regression
adjustment in addition to the preferred estimator by the authors improves the per-
formance when the propensity score is incorrectly speciﬁed.20 The aforementioned
Monte Carlo studies determine the bandwidth for kernel matching approaches based
on a standard leave-one-out cross-validation. The Monte Carlo results reported in
Galdo et al. (2008) show that it can be useful to base the bandwidth choice on
predictions for nontreated individuals who are close to the treated individuals.
Our estimation approach is not covered explicitly by the recent Monte Carlo studies
reported in Busso et al. (2009, 2011) and Huber et al. (2010). Both local linear ridge
matching (the best performing estimator in Frölich (2004) and Huber et al. (2010))
and IPW are not feasible in our application because we combine cell matching and
kernel matching and match on closeness in two dimensions at the same time. In the
case of treatment versus searching we have sizeable treatment groups (between 200
and 900 observations) and 17 to 75 times larger nontreatment groups (see table 2)
– and we solely estimate the average treatment eﬀect on the treated. Furthermore,
the overlap in the covariate distributions and the balancing of the covariates are
both very good in these cases (see Section 5.3). We expect our kernel regressions
to perform very well in the large nontreatment samples, in particular because we
take great care in details such as bandwidth choice and regression adjustments after
matching (see Section 4.6). We follow Huber et al. (2010) in that we match exactly
20Note that the studies do not analyze the eﬀect of regression adjustment for all estimation
approaches.
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on employment history variables – and in that we investigate the importance of
trimming highly inﬂuential comparison observations (see Section 5.3).
4.3 Empirical Content of the DCIA
The DCIA in equation (2) states that conditional on a given unemployment ex-
perience and a vector of observed covariates, the sequence of potential outcomes
associated with alternative treatment l (including nonparticipation l = 0) in the
same stratum is mean independent of the treatment status in this stratum. In a
dynamic context, nonparticipation in the current stratum entails the possibility of
participation in later strata. Our matching approach will produce valid estimates
if we consider all the determinants that jointly inﬂuence treatment status and po-
tential outcomes in the current stratum as well as in future strata. Conditional on
these determinants individuals are randomly allocated to one of the treatments in a
given stratum and there is balanced anticipation of future treatment or employment
chances.21 We argue in the following that these assumptions are plausible in light
of program assignment in Germany and the rich information in our data.22
Although the assignment to a training program typically occurs with the consent of
the job-seeker, considering his or her willingness to receive training and to work in a
speciﬁc ﬁeld, the assignment decision is up to the discretion of the caseworker during
the time period we consider. According to Blaschke and Plath (2000), indicators
available to the caseworker like the composition of a group of participants in a par-
ticular course or his/her assessment of the motivation of the unemployed played an
important role. Job placement has priority over program participation. The unem-
ployed are encouraged to continue job search at any time, even while participating
in a training program. The assignment to a particular training program is driven
strongly by the supply of courses (Schneider et al. (2006)). Evidence from qualitative
surveys in Schneider et al. (2006) suggests that belated assignments and referrals on
very short notice are commonly used in order to assure a high capacity utilization
of courses booked in advance and to keep up job search incentives. This suggests
that program assignment is not targeted but driven by region-speciﬁc variation in
the supply of courses throughout the year. From the perspective of the unemployed,
the assignment to a particular program cannot be perfectly anticipated. Moreover,
21‘Balanced’ means that treated and nontreated have the same predictions conditional on the
observables considered.
22See Section A in the Online-Appendix for a list of the covariates considered and descriptive
statistics. See Osikominu (2012) and her Supplementary Appendix for further institutional infor-
mation.
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the Database of Registered Job-Seekers involves a wide range of information that is
collected by the caseworker as a basis for his counseling activities and assignment
decisions.
To be speciﬁc, we consider the following variables that reﬂect the caseworker’s in-
formation on the motivation, plans and labor market prospects of a particular un-
employed: the caseworker’s assessment of the job-seeker’s current health status,
information on his/her previous health status (during the last two years before the
start of the current unemployment spell), a dummy variable indicating whether the
unemployed person appeared to lack motivation (e.g. failed to show up at regular
meetings), dummies indicating whether the job-seeker dropped out of a program,
whether beneﬁts were withdrawn, and whether the person participated in a program
providing psychosocial support, where all variables refer to the last three years unless
said otherwise. In addition, we include variables indicating whether the job-seeker
would like to work in a diﬀerent occupation, whether he/she is looking for a part-
time job, and the number of job proposals he/she received from the employment
oﬃce.23
The literature (e.g. Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997), Heckman et al. (1998),
Heckman et al. (1999), Heckman and Smith (1999)) stresses the importance of con-
ditioning ﬂexibly on lagged employment and wages, beneﬁt receipt history, and local
labor market conditions. Our sample of analysis involves individuals who, between
2000 and 2002, exit regular employment lasting three months or longer. Our data
allow us to include in the propensity score a rich set of variables depicting past
employment and nonemployment histories as well as local labor market conditions.
To account for potential anticipatory eﬀects regarding re-employment, we use the
complete longitudinal information in our administrative data sources covering em-
ployment and beneﬁt receipt and impose several restrictions to ensure that our
sample as a whole as well as the diﬀerent treatment and comparison groups are
suﬃciently homogeneous. We use several diﬀerent variables recording wages prior
to unemployment as well as occupation and industry of the last job, indicators of
whether the last job was part-time, whether it was a white-collar or blue-collar
position, the reason why the job ended, and the quarter of the beginning of the un-
employment spell. We also include indicators of whether the person was employed
23Note that these variables reﬂect information that is collected in the course of the counseling
process using standardized, closed-ended answer formats. For the three variables ‘occchange’,
‘endlastjob’, and ‘family’ (see Section A in the Online-Appendix), the share of missings is relatively
high. Nevertheless, they often prove signiﬁcant in the propensity scores. This likely reﬂects the
fact that the missings are informative as well. For instance, job-seekers who are undetermined
about their future occupation might choose not to answer the question.
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in month 6, 12, or 24 before the beginning of the unemployment spell, the number
of days employed during the preceding seven years as well as the average annual
earnings and the annual employment status in each of the seven years before the
beginning of the unemployment spell.
As in Card and Sullivan (1988), we stratify treatment and comparison individuals
based on their employment history sequences as well as elapsed unemployment du-
ration (see also Dolton and Smith (2011)). We construct ten diﬀerent employment
history groups that indicate diﬀerent combinations of the annual employment status
of an individual during the four years preceding the unemployment spell.24 We use
the nine sequences (1000), (1001), (1010), (1011), (1100), (1101), (1110), (1111),
and (0000). E.g. the sequence (1010) represents employment during the ﬁrst and
the third year before entry into unemployment and nonemployment during the sec-
ond and the fourth year. The nine sequences considered so far cover over 95% of the
cases. The remaining sequences are subsumed in a residual category. We include
dummy variables for each sequence in the propensity score.
Turning to nonemployment, we include the entitlement period for unemployment
beneﬁts at the beginning of unemployment as well as variables measuring the
duration of unemployment transfer payments (i.e. unemployment beneﬁts, unem-
ployment assistance, or subsistence allowance) in days during the last three years,
the number of days without any information in the data set (e.g. periods of self-
employment or out of the labor force), indicators for whether somebody was disabled
or unable to work at some point in time during the preceding three years, and a
variable recording previous contacts with the employment oﬃce during the last three
years. Finally, to model local labor market conditions we use several diﬀerent vari-
ables on the unemployment rate in the county of residence, indicators for the federal
state and indicators for the economic situation of the local labor market.
4.4 Specification of the Propensity Scores
Using all of the variables described in the previous section as possible regressors,
we ﬁt the propensity scores separately for each of the six evaluation subsamples
(men/women, stratum 1/2/3), and each treatment comparison pair. In each case,
we run an extensive speciﬁcation search. The ﬁnal speciﬁcation was chosen based on
which variables (according to institutional and economic knowledge) may drive the
24A person is considered as employed in a given year if he/she is employed for at least 50% of
the days. The results are not sensitive to the exact choice of the cutoﬀ point.
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selection into programs, based on statistical signiﬁcance of the variables included,
and based on the balancing tests described below. We usually start with a fairly
general speciﬁcation and drop variables that are grossly insigniﬁcant. This leads to
satisfactory speciﬁcations in most cases. In the few cases in which the balancing
condition fails, we modify the speciﬁcation and reinclude covariates or add inter-
actions in order to eliminate the covariate imbalance. We take particular care in
ensuring that pre-treatment employment and earnings outcomes are well balanced
between treatment and comparison group members. The ﬁnal speciﬁcations typi-
cally include between 20 and 35 covariates (see Section B.1 in the Online-Appendix
for the estimation results).
4.5 Testing for Covariate Balance
We employ two diﬀerent balancing tests to check whether our treatment and compar-
ison groups are suﬃciently balanced.25 First, we test whether the means of important
covariates diﬀer signiﬁcantly between treatment and matched comparison groups us-
ing bootstrap t-tests and Wald tests (for groups of variables that belong together).
Our bootstrap approach accounts for clustering at the individual level which is of
particular importance as members of the comparison group can be used as compar-
isons more than once. In each subsample, the comparison of means is based on the
same set of 90 regressors that we consider particularly important (cf. the discussion
in Section 4.3). We calculate the matched mean of a given regressor by applying the
matching procedure described above to this regressor in exactly the same way as we
do to predict the counterfactual employment and earnings outcomes. Second, we
investigate whether treated and matched nontreated individuals diﬀer signiﬁcantly
in their employment and earnings outcomes over a period of seven years before the
beginning of unemployment. We estimate these diﬀerences in the same way as the
treatment eﬀects after the beginning of the program. By construction, treated in-
dividuals and their matched counterparts exhibit the same unemployment duration
until the beginning of treatment as well as the same type of four-year employment
history before the beginning of the unemployment spell. We report the results of
both balancing tests in Section 5.3 and in Section B.2 in the Online-Appendix
25See Lee (2012) for a recent critical assessment of balancing tests.
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4.6 Regression Adjustment and Test for Effect Heterogeneity
The estimated ATT may be biased if treated and matched comparison individuals
are not matched well by observed characteristics aﬀecting the treatment eﬀect.26
Following Abadie and Imbens (2011) and Mueser et al. (2007), we apply an re-
gression based adjustment to investigate the existence of any remaining mismatch
between treated and comparison individuals after kernel matching. While Abadie
and Imbens (2011) propose the ex post regression adjustment as a device to remove
the leading bias term of the nearest neighbor matching estimator (Abadie and Im-
bens (2006)), in our case of kernel matching, the bias of the nonparametric kernel
regression vanishes asymptotically. Nevertheless, as some mismatch in the levels of
the matching variables between each treated unit and the comparison units may
remain in any ﬁnite sample (Mueser et al. (2007, p. 765)) we use the ex post re-
gression adjustment to investigate the existence of such mismatch bias.27 At the
same time, we use it to test for treatment eﬀect heterogeneity.28 In fact, estimation
of the ATT provides a semi-parametric, aggregate impact measure of potentially
heterogeneous individual treatment eﬀects depending upon observed characteristics
of the participating individuals.
In our outcome regressions, the dependent variable, Y¯i(u), is the average of the
individual period speciﬁc outcomes over 24 months from month u onwards. We
focus on this global outcome in order to abstract from the volatility over time of
the monthly outcomes. Pooling over all possible starting dates u in stratum s, i.e.
u ∈ [us, u¯s], s = 1, 2, 3, we run the following weighted regression:
(4) min
αˆ,βˆ,γˆ,δˆ
∑
i
u¯s∑
u=us
gi(u)[Y¯i(u)− αˆ−X iβˆ − γˆDs,i −Ds,i(X i − X¯)δˆ]
2 ,
where the summation is over all individuals i who either receive treatment k or l
26A possible mismatch may be caused by a misspeciﬁcation of the propensity score or by the fact,
that despite the validity of the DCIA, the particular sample draws for the observed characteristics
may diﬀer between treated and matched comparison individuals. The former involves a bias, that
remains in a large sample if a parametric propensity score is used, while the latter involves a ﬁnite
sample bias.
27Mueser et al. (2007) adjust each set of comparison cases for a particular treated case using a
linear regression in the weighted data set of comparison cases (see also Heinrich et al. (2010) for
this approach). Unlike us they do not use the ex post regression to study eﬀect heterogeneity.
28To our knowledge, recent evaluation studies rarely estimate ex post outcome regressions to
study eﬀect heterogeneity. In the literature on statistical treatment choice, Frölich (2008) uses a
similar approach to predict potential outcomes as a function of individual characteristics. Huber
et al. (2010) report Monte Carlo evidence for treatment eﬀect estimators based on such ex post
outcome regressions, but do not investigate eﬀect heterogeneity.
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in the stratum considered. X i denotes a vector of observed characteristics and X¯
the average of the characteristics in the sample of individuals receiving treatment
k.29 Ds,i is a dummy variable for receiving treatment k in stratum s, i.e. Ds,i = 1
(Ds,i = 0) if individual i receives treatment k (l).
gi(u) is the weight associated with treatment start u. For a treated individual
(Ds,i = 1), the weight picks the observed start month, i.e. gi(u) = 1 for persons
starting treatment k in month u and zero otherwise. For a nontreated individual j
(Ds,j = 0) serving as a comparison for treatment k starting in month u the weight
gj(u) equals
∑
d∈{Tu=k∧Uo=u−1;u∈[us,u¯s]}
K
(
pd−pj
hp
)
· h
|cd−cj |
c
∑
n∈{Tu˜=l∧Uo≥u−1;u,u˜∈[us,u¯s]}
K
(
pd−pn
hp
)
· h
|cd−cn|
c
,
where d indexes those individuals starting treatment k in month u (Tu = k ∧ Uo =
u−1) and n those comparison units who are still in open unemployment in the month
before treatment k starts (Uo ≥ u − 1). The function inside the sum corresponds
to the normalized kernel weight as given in equation (3), where the normalization
guarantees that the total sum of weights for d across nontreated individuals j sums
to one. Note, that j is used repeatedly for each possible treatment starting date u
in the respective stratum for which j serves as a comparison unit, i.e. observation j
is used up to (u¯s − us + 1) times in the pooled regression (4).
The term X iβˆ in equation (4) controls for the eﬀect of the characteristics on the
average outcome variable. The coeﬃcient on the treatment dummy, γˆ, gives the
mismatch corrected estimate of the aggregate ATT. This mismatch corrected esti-
mate can be compared to the estimate obtained without the additional regression
adjustment. If the two estimates are similar, then our matching procedure works
well in aligning the distributions of the conditioning variables in the comparison
group to that of the treatment group. The coeﬃcients on the vector of interaction
terms, δˆ, give the ceteris paribus changes in the treatment eﬀect when changing
the corresponding characteristics. If δ = 0, then there is no eﬀect heterogeneity
by the level of covariates. The standard errors of the estimated coeﬃcients in (4)
are obtained through a full bootstrap for the matching estimator by rerunning the
regression for all resamples.
29All the explanatory variables in Xi are dummies.
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5 Which Program Works and for Whom?
5.1 Effectiveness of Training Compared with Searching
Figures 3 to 6 show the evaluation results for the comparison of training vs not
participating in any active labor market program (i.e. ‘searching’) in a given time
window. We distinguish three diﬀerent time windows (strata) of elapsed unemploy-
ment experience: 1 to 3 months (stratum 1), 4 to 6 months (stratum 2), and 7 to 12
months (stratum 3). Each graph displays, for diﬀerent points in time given on the
horizontal axis, the average treatment eﬀect on the treated (ATT), i.e. the diﬀer-
ence between the observed outcome with training and the estimated counterfactual
outcome without training averaged over those who participate in the program in a
given time window. On the time axis in our graphs, positive values denote months
since program start, while negative values represent pre-unemployment months and
years. We omit the period between the start of unemployment and the start of the
program in which both comparison and treatment persons are unemployed. The
dashed lines around the estimated ATT are bootstrapped 95% pointwise conﬁdence
bands. Treatment eﬀects for a particular time period are statistically signiﬁcant if
zero is not contained in the conﬁdence band. In each ﬁgure, the results for men
(women) are in the left (right) column. While ﬁgures 3 and 5 refer to the diﬀerence
in employment rates, ﬁgures 4 and 6 represent diﬀerences in pre-tax earnings. For
both outcome measures, subsidized employment is counted as nonemployment.30
— Figure 3 and Figure 4 about here —
Turning to the estimated employment eﬀects of short-term training (STT) in ﬁgure
3 we ﬁnd negative eﬀects shortly after the program start in the order of minus ﬁve
percentage points (ppoints). This suggests that, while enrolled in the program, par-
ticipants have a ﬁve ppoints lower monthly employment rate than they would have
if they did not participate in the program. These lock-in eﬀects do not last for more
than two to three months, which is in line with the short duration of STT programs
of about one month. After the lock-in period, the treatment eﬀects turn positive in
general, but they are not always statistically signiﬁcant. The results diﬀer strongly
30Our earnings information comes from social security records which is collected only once in a
given calendar year if a person is employed with the same employer throughout and no changes in
relevant information, such as a change of the health insurance, occur within the year. Observed
changes in monthly earnings are therefore due to wage changes with the same employer, job-to-job
changes, or job-to-nonemployment transitions.
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across strata. While there is no evidence for statistically signiﬁcant treatment eﬀects
for individuals participating in the ﬁrst three months of their unemployment spell
(stratum 1), treatment eﬀects for men starting an STT program in months 7 to 12
of their unemployment spell (stratum 3), and women starting one in month 4 or
later are signiﬁcantly positive. Accordingly, the monthly employment rate of men
(women) participating in STT is increased by about 5 ppoints (about 11 ppoints)
after the end of the lock-in period (see also table 3). The impact estimates for
earnings in ﬁgure 4 show a corresponding pattern. There are statistically signiﬁcant
earnings gains of up to e100-200 for female participants in STT in strata 2 and 3,
and marginally signiﬁcant eﬀects of up to e100 for male participants in stratum 3
and female participants in stratum 1. Averaging over the second year after program
start, the monthly eﬀect is e87 for men in stratum 3 and e169 for women in strata
2 and 3 (see table 4).
— Figure 5 and Figure 6 about here —
Estimates of the employment eﬀects for the more substantive classroom further
training programs (CFT) are given in ﬁgure 5. The most conspicuous diﬀerence
between these results and those for STT programs is the long and pronounced lock-
in eﬀect. During the ﬁrst six months after program start, participants have an
employment rate that is up to 25 ppoints lower than it would have been if they
had not taken part in the program. From month 7 onwards, the treatment eﬀects
recover, eventually turning positive 10 to 12 months after program start. The lock-in
period is longer and entails larger employment losses for people who take up their
treatment during the ﬁrst 6 months of unemployment (strata 1 and 2). In contrast,
people who have been unemployed for more than 6 months (stratum 3) experience
less deep and shorter lock-in eﬀects. While there is little evidence for statistically
signiﬁcant employment eﬀects for men starting a CFT program in months 1 to 6 of
their unemployment spell (strata 1 and 2) or women enrolling in the ﬁrst 3 months
of unemployment (stratum 1), treatment eﬀects for longer-term unemployed men
(stratum 3) and medium to longer-term unemployed women (strata 2 and 3) are
sizeable and statistically signiﬁcant. After the initial lock-in phase, they eventually
exceed 10 ppoints, with an average of 7 ppoints throughout the second year since
program start (see also table 3).
Figure 6 reveals a similar pattern for the earnings impacts of CFT compared with
searching. After an initial lock-in eﬀect, there are signiﬁcant earnings gains for
male participants in CFT in stratum 3 (and marginally in stratum 2), and in all
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three strata for women. Especially for men, the earnings gains after lock-in tend
to be larger than those for STT, often attaining e200 per month. This means that
although, after lock-in, CFT and STT yield comparable employment gains, CFT
participants beneﬁt on average more from their program than participants in STT,
which is consistent with the fact that CFT involves a more sizeable human capital
investment compared to STT. Hence, CFT programs, unlike STT programs, con-
tribute to the development of human capital that is rewarded on the labor market.
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the estimated treatment eﬀects during the ﬁrst two years
after program start. We report the diﬀerence of the estimates regarding the average
monthly employment and earnings gains or losses over the course of the ﬁrst and the
second year. For STT vs Searching (rows 1 and 5 of tables 3 and 4), in cases with
slightly negative eﬀects during the ﬁrst year these are generally oﬀset by positive
eﬀects in the second year. Thus, the average eﬀect tends to be zero or positive for
STT after two years. In contrast, it remains negative in the majority of cases for
CFT vs searching after two years (rows 3 and 7 of tables 3 and 4). Consistent with
the graphical results, when we compare the estimates across strata the estimated
eﬀect increases (becomes less negative) the later a STT or CFT program starts
during unemployment.
What explains the diﬀering treatment eﬀects across strata? First, a large number of
those having become unemployed recently ﬁnd new jobs easily without participating
in a training program. If these people are assigned to a CFT program anyway,
they will be ‘locked-in’, while many of their counterparts in the comparison group
quickly exit to employment. The evidence in Osikominu (2012) suggests that the
opportunity cost of participating in a long program is in fact higher for people
with a high probability of exiting unemployment without treatment. Our ﬁndings
in Section 6 are also consistent with this view because early program participants
tend to be a positive selection of all unemployed and are therefore matched with
nonparticipants who exit unemployment very quickly. Second, treatment eﬀects
tend to be higher for the late program starts if many of the long-term unemployed
in the comparison group abandon their job search and move out of the labor force.
Our additional evaluation results for the outcome variable ‘leaving the labor force’
(see Section C.1 in the Online-Appendix) conﬁrm that participants enrolling after
a longer unemployment experience have a reduced probability to drop out of the
labor force compared to the situation if they did not receive training. Hence, an
important channel through which training programs work consists in keeping the
long-term unemployed in the labor force.
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— Table 3 and 4 about here —
5.2 Heterogeneity of Training Impacts
Given that, in many cases, training programs show positive treatment eﬀects in
the medium-run when compared to attending no program in the same stratum, the
questions arise (i) who beneﬁts most from a given program and (ii) which program is
the best for a given subpopulation. The results in the previous section suggest that
STT may have similar or even more positive eﬀects compared to CFT when each
of the programs is compared to attending no program. However, this does not nec-
essarily mean that participants in STT could not have improved their employment
chances by attending CFT instead, or that participants in CFT would not have lost
from taking part in STT instead. This is because the selection of the treated may
diﬀer by treatment.
Tables 3 and 4 also contain estimates for the direct comparisons between STT and
CFT, which allows us to address question (2) (see also Section C.2 in the Online-
Appendix for further evidence). Row 2 for men and row 6 for women in tables 3
and 4 show the average eﬀect of participating in STT instead of CFT for the STT
participants. The estimates are generally positive suggesting that those participating
in STT could not have fared better with the more intensive CFT program. For
instance, the numbers in row 2, column 1-2 of table 3 suggest that male participants
in STT in stratum 1 have on average a 16 ppoint higher employment rate in year
1 and a 2 ppoint higher employment rate in year 2 compared to the situation in
which they would participate in CFT. The advantage of STT over CFT for those
who participate in STT is generally higher in year 1 than in year 2, which reﬂects
the diﬀering enrollment lengths of the two programs. When we look at the opposite
comparison of CFT vs STT for those who participate in CFT (rows 4 and 8 in tables
3 and 4) similar patterns emerge during the ﬁrst year after program start. During
the second year after program start, when most CFT participants have completed
their training, the estimated eﬀect changes in favor of CFT. Overall however, CFT
participants could in most cases have done similarly well or even better with a
STT program. This is remarkable since it means that these people could have been
assigned to the much less expensive STT programs without deteriorating their labor
market chances.
Now, we turn to the question of who beneﬁts most from a given program. The results
presented so far reveal some heterogeneity in the eﬀects for diﬀerent subpopulations.
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A consistent ﬁnding is that programs are only eﬀective for those individuals who
start a program after having been unemployed for some time. However, note that
this is subject to the caveat that the selection of eligible individuals changes over
the course of the unemployment spell. Another ﬁnding is that training eﬀects are
generally larger for women than for men (ﬁgures 3 and 5). In the following, we
further investigate whether the treatment eﬀect depends upon further observable
personal characteristics. For this purpose, we regress the individual-level outcomes
averaged over the ﬁrst 24 months since program start on the treatment dummy,
a set of observed covariates and the interactions with the treatment dummy. The
comparison observations are weighted according to their matching weights, see Sec-
tion 4.6. We estimate a ﬁrst regression including all the personal characteristics
and interactions with the treatment dummy and three further regressions where we
only include interaction eﬀects for one out of three subsets of characteristics (i.e. for
demographic variables, human capital variables, and characteristics of the previous
job). By adding the interaction eﬀects separately, the power of the tests is likely to
be higher.
— Table 5 here —
The results of the Wald-tests for eﬀect heterogeneity for all interaction variables are
reported in table 5 and for the separate groups in Sections D.2-D.3 in the Online-
Appendix. The full coeﬃcient estimates are reported in Section D.1 in the Online-
Appendix. In almost all cases, the Wald-test statistics for the null hypothesis that
the interactions between the treatment dummy and the characteristics have zero
coeﬃcients are nowhere close to signiﬁcance, neither when the speciﬁcation includes
interactions with all individual characteristics nor when we undertook separate anal-
yses by type of variables. The lowest p-values are around 10% in two cases and, they
are much higher in the remaining 34 cases. A small number of single coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcant but no clear patterns emerge. The overall insigniﬁcance suggests that
we should not interpret the single signiﬁcant coeﬃcients. We conclude for the com-
parisons of training vs searching that there is little heterogeneity along observed
characteristics after conditioning on gender and stratum.31
31We are not aware of state-of-the-art evaluation studies which investigate eﬀect heterogeneity
within subgroups deﬁned by gender and elapsed unemployment. Thus, it is diﬃcult to relate our
ﬁndings to the literature. Most closely related to our analysis is the paper by Lechner et al. (2011).
They stratify the treatment samples for men and women in a number of dimensions and ﬁnd some
diﬀerences beyond gender diﬀerences. According to our reading of the paper, Lechner et al. (2011)
do not seem to provide evidence for signiﬁcant eﬀect heterogeneity within subgroups deﬁned by
gender and the elapsed duration of unemployment.
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What explains the generally higher treatment eﬀects for women compared with
men? While our ﬁnding is in line with the literature (see Bergemann and van den
Berg (2008) for an overview), this view has been challenged in a recent study by
Lechner and Wiehler (2011) who, using Austrian data, argue that positive eﬀects
might be overstated if fertility responds to prolonged unemployment. We cannot rule
out such an eﬀect because we do not observe pregnancies in our data. However, as
indirect evidence against the hypothesis of an eﬀect due to pregnancies, we ﬁnd that
treatment eﬀects do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between women below age 40, who are
in their fertility phase, and women above age 40, who are mostly past their fertility
phase. Other studies (e.g. Lechner et al. (2007), Osikominu (2012)) have attributed
part of the gender diﬀerences in training impacts to diﬀerences in the occupational
composition. We could not detect heterogeneous eﬀects across occupations and
industries after conditioning on gender and stratum. Our additional results for the
outcome indicating a permanent exit from the labor force (see Section C.1 in the
Online-Appendix) suggest that the labor market attachment eﬀect of training is
slightly stronger for women than for men. This diﬀerence may partly explain the
gender gap in employment and earnings impacts. Unfortunately, we cannot explore
this issue further because our do not allow to determine exactly whether (and for
what reason) an exit from the labor market occurred.
5.3 Assessing the Quality of Our Benchmark Estimates
We provide extensive checks of the quality of our benchmark matching approach,
for which the estimates are reported above. First, we investigate the balancing of
covariates by comparing the means of 90 covariates between treated and matched
comparison groups. The detailed results are contained in Section B.2 in the Online-
Appendix, rows labeled ‘Benchmark’ refer to our benchmark matching procedure,
rows labeled ‘Raw’ to the raw, unmatched samples. We conduct t-tests Wald-tests
of equality of means. The ﬁgures in Section B.2 in the Online-Appendix show that,
in nearly all cases, the p-values of the Wald-test statistics clearly exceed 5% after
conducting our benchmark matching procedure. The Monte Carlo evidence reported
by Lee (2012), which is, however, not based on clustered standard errors, suggests
that balancing tests of the type used here tend to reject covariate balance too often.
Thus, we are conﬁdent that covariates are well balanced in our benchmark estimates.
Second, we ﬁnd that the distributions of the propensity scores and covariates on
which we match exactly overlap suﬃciently between treated and comparison groups
(see Section B.3 in the Online-Appendix). For the comparisons of training versus
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searching, the smallest (largest) propensity score values in the treatment group are
larger (smaller) than the minimum (maximum) in the comparison group in most
cases (see Section B.3.1 in the Online-Appendix). In the few cases where this does
not hold, the extrema in the treated sample do not exceed the corresponding extrema
in the comparison sample by more than ﬁve percentage points. For the comparisons
of one training program against another, the overlap is slightly worse but still suﬃ-
cient. Thus, we do not need to trim any of the propensity score distributions of the
treated. Further, Section B.3.2 in the Online-Appendix shows how many treated
and comparison observations had to be dropped because of empty cells for any of
the covariates on which we match exactly. For the comparisons of training ver-
sus searching no treated observations are dropped. For the pairwise comparisons
of training programs, between 1 and 3% of the treated observations are dropped,
except for CFT versus STT where 17% cannot be used.
Third, as a balancing test on the employment history, we compute placebo treatment
eﬀects also for the seven years before the start of the unemployment spell considered.
This is also similar to the preprogram test of Heckman and Hotz (1989), but note
that we partly match on employment history. If our matching procedure works well,
treatment eﬀects should be zero in that period. In 23 out of the 24 cases depicted
in ﬁgures 3 to 6, pretreatment outcomes of treatment and comparison groups do
not diﬀer signiﬁcantly during any of the seven years before the start of the current
unemployment spell. A slight outlier is the earnings impacts of STT for women in
stratum 1 (panel A of ﬁgure 4) where treated individuals have signiﬁcantly lower
earnings in year six before the start of unemployment. Consequently, the earnings
gain induced by the program may be even larger than the estimates suggest. Section
C.2 in the Online-Appendix contains the graphical results for the comparisons of
one training program against another. Here again, employment outcomes are not
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in any of the preceding seven years in any of the graphs.
Fourth, as in Huber et al. (2010), we examine the existence and role of overly
inﬂuential observations on our benchmark estimates in Section B.4 of the Online-
Appendix. Only in one out of the 24 cases a comparison person has a weight that
exceeds 4%, i.e. for the case ‘STT vs CFT, males, stratum 3’. In ten cases – all of
them concerning pairwise comparisons of training programs –, the maximal weight
exceeds 2%. The diﬀerence between the benchmark estimates and those obtained
without the comparison observations with weights above 4% and 2%, respectively,
is in general small. In terms of kernel matching weights the inﬂuence of the most
important comparison individuals is thus much smaller than reported in Huber et al.
(2010). This is due to the fact that we align individuals by elapsed unemployment
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duration and not by actual and hypothetical program start dates, which implies
a smaller pool of potential comparison units than in our case. Correspondingly,
excluding (trimming) the most inﬂuential comparison individuals (even with a lower
threshold than used in Huber et al. (2010)) has little eﬀect on the estimates. Thus,
in our benchmark estimates we do not need to trim the most inﬂuential observations.
Finally, we investigate whether after matching there remains mismatch between
treated and comparison units. We use the outcome regressions on the treatment
dummy, personal characteristics and their interactions with the treatment dummy
to compute ‘mismatch corrected’ treatment eﬀects (see Section 4.6). The coeﬃcient
on the treatment dummy gives the treatment eﬀect net of any mismatch in personal
characteristics that may have remained after matching. If our matching approach
works well, the mismatch corrected average treatment eﬀects should coincide with
uncorrected average treatment eﬀects. The results reported in table 5 show that
the uncorrected ATT lies in no case outside of the 95%-conﬁdence interval of the
mismatch-corrected ATT. Thus, mismatch does not appear to be a problem.
6 How Sensitive Are Impact Estimates to Data Fea-
tures and Methodological Choices?
Given the richness of our data and the wide range of possible speciﬁcation choices,
it is a highly relevant question to what extent data features and methodological
choices inﬂuence the empirical results. The following analysis is therefore meant
to contribute to the understanding of what matters for the design and outcome of
an evaluation analysis. In the following, we start from our most comprehensive
speciﬁcation (whose results we reported in the previous sections) as a benchmark.
We then drop or modify certain speciﬁcation features, e.g. particular information
in the data or the matching approach. We analyze the sensitivity of the results for
employment in a given time period. The complete sensitivity analyses are available
in Section E in the Online-Appendix. Here we only report results for selected cases
in order to illustrate the range of variation that may result as a consequence of data
or methodological changes.
6.1 Sensitivity Analysis 1: Employment History
In our ﬁrst sensitivity analysis, following Card and Sullivan (1988), Heckman and
Smith (1999), and Dolton and Smith (2011), we investigate how much diﬀerence
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it makes to condition on past labor market outcomes in a ﬂexible way. Starting
from our benchmark speciﬁcation, we ﬁrst drop the requirement of exact matching
on four-year history sequences. In a second step, we remove in addition the history
sequence dummies from the propensity score. In the third step, the remaining seven-
year history variables are dropped. The fourth step further removes all information
on the beneﬁt history. In a ﬁfth step, we return to the benchmark speciﬁcation
but omit the requirement to exactly match on the elapsed unemployment duration
within strata. Note that this ﬁfth step is conceptually diﬀerent from the ﬁrst four
steps as these omit information about the pre-unemployment period, while the ﬁfth
step omits information about the period after the beginning of unemployment.
— Figures 7 and 8 here —
The results of this exercise are shown in ﬁgures 7 and 8. The left column always
shows the case ‘CFT vs searching for men in stratum 2’, while the right column
presents one further case illustrating what else may happen. The results show that
omitting the requirement of exact matching on employment histories in general
changes impact estimates only a little. In the case of ‘CFT vs searching for men in
stratum 2’ treatment eﬀects are pulled downwards by a moderately small amount
suggesting that not controlling for employment sequences leaves too many relatively
successful individuals in the comparison group. However, this result does not gen-
eralize to the other cases (see Section E.1 in the Online Appendix). More typical is
what is shown for the case ‘SST vs searching for men in stratum 2’ (panel B of ﬁgure
7), where not conditioning on employment sequences makes hardly a diﬀerence. If
anything, the estimates are slightly pulled upwards compared with the benchmark.
The same is true if in addition the employment history dummies are dropped from
the propensity score and the window of pre-unemployment information is reduced
from seven to three years (steps 2 and 3). If, in addition, beneﬁt-related information
is dropped, the estimates also change very little (step 4, ﬁgure 8).
By contrast, dropping the requirement of exact matching on elapsed unemploy-
ment duration in the benchmark speciﬁcation (step 5, ﬁgure 8) considerably reduces
estimated treatment eﬀects in most cases, especially for individuals with long unem-
ployment durations. The case ‘SST vs searching for men in stratum 3’ involves the
strongest change: positive treatment eﬀects are completely eliminated. The expla-
nation is that treated individuals tend to be incorrectly matched with comparison
group members who have already found employment if one does not control for
the elapsed unemployment duration at program start. This pulls down estimated
treatment eﬀects.
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Apart from the result that matching on elapsed unemployment duration is impor-
tant, our results suggest that conditioning ﬂexibly on details of the employment
history makes little diﬀerence (steps 1 to 4). This is in contrast to some of the re-
sults reported in Card and Sullivan (1988), Heckman and Smith (1999), and Dolton
and Smith (2011). Unlike in these studies, our evaluation sample is already con-
structed in a way that strongly conditions on past labor market experience. If
this basically eliminated the heterogeneity, it would not be surprising that the way
in which we control for past employment information does not matter that much.
Therefore, we further investigate the role played by the employment history vari-
ables in driving the selection into treatment in our application. First, employment
and beneﬁt related variables are in many cases signiﬁcant determinants of the es-
timated propensity scores (see Section B.1 in the Online-Appendix).32 Second, our
detailed balancing tests reported in Section B.2 in the Online-Appendix show that
our treatment and the comparison samples signiﬁcantly diﬀer with respect to most
employment and beneﬁt variables before matching. Moreover, when we carry out
those balancing tests for selected variants of our sensitivity analysis, we ﬁnd that
matching based on more parsimonious speciﬁcations (e.g. steps 2 and 4) fails to
balance important employment and beneﬁt variables. Therefore, it is even more
remarkable that omitting the detailed information contained in steps 1 to 4 causes
such little changes in the estimated treatment eﬀects.
6.2 Sensitivity Analysis 2: Personal Characteristics
In our second sensitivity analysis, we vary the amount of personal information used
for matching and the way in which it enters the propensity score. First, we in-
vestigate what happens if we omit the personality variables (i.e. information on
whether the person took part in a program providing psychosocial support in the
past, whether there were signs of a lack of motivation during previous unemployment
spells, information on past penalties or past dropout from a program, the number of
job proposals received, and the desire to change the occupation). In a second step,
we omit in addition rich personal information which was included in the propensity
score in the benchmark speciﬁcation (i.e. information on household type, number
and age of dependent children, marital status, information on health, disability, pre-
vious part-time employment and reasons why the last job was ended). In a related
32An exception from this are the four-year history dummies. Apart from the case of STT vs
searching for women, the four-year history dummies are insigniﬁcant in the estimated propensity
score. Other employment variables such as the number of days employed or receiving beneﬁts in
any year before unemployment start are often signiﬁcant.
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but separate step 3, we compare the benchmark speciﬁcation with a speciﬁcation
in which all variables are only used in a ﬁxed, basic way without undertaking a
separate speciﬁcation search for each group. In step 4, we compare our benchmark
speciﬁcation to one in which we only include variables used in the evaluation study
by Mueser et al. (2007) which represents a typical application in this ﬁeld. In step
5, we drop the matching on the propensity score. In step 6, we omit in addition
the exact matching on employment histories and align treated and comparison units
only with respect to their prior unemployment experience and calendar time.
— Figure 9 here —
The results in panels A and B of ﬁgure 9 show that omitting the personality variables
changes impact estimates surprisingly little as long as all other variables of the
benchmark speciﬁcation are controlled for. By contrast, omitting other personal
information (panels C, D) may have a considerable eﬀect, not so much in the case
of CFT vs searching, but in practically all other cases (especially for STT after
short unemployment). The direction of the changes is not entirely consistent, but
omitting rich personal information tends to overstate treatment eﬀects, suggesting
that treated individuals generally have favorable personal characteristics. The fact
that the inclusion of personality variables does not change much suggests that the
kind of information they represent are already largely included in the employment
history variables and in the other personal characteristics. This is in contrast to the
ﬁndings in Dolton and Smith (2011), where similar attitudinal variables make a big
diﬀerence.33 The results for step 3 (panels E, F) suggest that varying the amount
of speciﬁcation search leads to relatively minor changes in most cases. The changes
also do not display any clear direction.
Mueser et al. (2007) (henceforth MTG) provide a recent state-of-the-art evaluation
of job training programs based on administrative data from Missouri. Their setup
is representative of what is possible using administrative data taken from diﬀerent
sources in the US and other countries. Our data are also based on administrative
registers but seem to be richer in terms of individual characteristics and details
of employment histories. Step 4 compares our benchmark speciﬁcation to a basic
speciﬁcation which is as close as possible to the one used in MTG (p. 768, basic
33Note, however, that the attitudinal variables in Dolton and Smith (2011) were directly elicited
in a survey, while our variables are derived from information on program participation, receipt
of unemployment beneﬁts and other information available to the caseworker. The population
examined in Dolton and Smith (2011) also diﬀers a lot from that considered here.
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demographic and educational variables – i.e. age, education, occupation, national-
ity and region – as well as four quarters of earnings history and four quarters of
employment dummies based on whether earnings in the given quarter were posi-
tive). We stick to our requirement to exactly match on the unemployment duration
prior to treatment even though MTG do not measure unemployment durations at
a monthly frequency. This implies that the treatment and comparison groups in
MTG are more heterogeneous compared to our sample. Dropping this requirement
has a strong impact on our results as step 5 of sensitivity analysis 1 has shown, but
it may be less important in the institutional environment of MTG in which program
participation does not require unemployment.
— Figure 10 here —
The results for step 4 are shown in panels A and B of ﬁgure 10. It turns out that in
most cases treatment eﬀects are overstated if matching is based on this more parsi-
monious information set (panel A, ‘CFT vs searching for men in stratum 2’, is rela-
tively atypical in that respect, most cases look more like panel B, ‘CFT vs searching
for men in stratum 3’). This speciﬁcation diﬀers from our benchmark speciﬁcation
mainly in dropping detailed history information and rich personal information. Our
detailed sensitivity analysis on history information showed that dropping this kind
of information led only to small changes in the results, as long as the requirement of
the same elapsed unemployment duration before program start is not dropped (we
do not drop this requirement here). But dropping rich personal information such
as information on family type and health status, leads to an overstatement of the
treatment eﬀects. In fact, part of the ﬁgures of the step 2 of sensitivity analysis 2
(panels C and D of ﬁgure 9 and the respective graphs in Section E.2.2 in the Online-
Appendix) look very similar to the ﬁgures of the sensitivity analysis involving the
MTG speciﬁcation for the propensity score. The remaining diﬀerence must be due
to dropping even more information from the propensity score (mainly industry vari-
ables, a white collar dummy and exact measurement of days in employment during
the last three years) and to dropping detailed history information and rich personal
information at the same time.34
Panels C-F of ﬁgure 10 show the eﬀects of omitting the propensity score altogether
(step 5 and 6). In fact, the results of these steps are remarkably similar to the results
34In line with our results, Lechner and Wunsch (2011) also ﬁnd that the availability of a rich
set of covariates, including e.g. information on health, job search behavior and the timing of
unemployment and program start, matters to account for the selection into treatment.
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of the parsimonious MTG speciﬁcation (panels A, B, step 4). Again, the case ‘CFT
vs searching for men in stratum 2’ is relatively untypical for the range of results. In
general and particularly for women, estimated treatment eﬀects are pulled upwards
considerably when omitting propensity score matching. This demonstrates that
treated individuals are in general positively selected (because treatment eﬀects are
lower when personal characteristics are accounted for). The similarity between the
estimates that omit the propensity scores altogether and the relatively parsimonious
MTG speciﬁcation reinforces the point that such a parsimonious speciﬁcation may
fail to provide unbiased treatment eﬀect estimates. Furthermore, the similarity of
the estimates from step 5 and step 6 underscores that this bias is not related to the
omission of exact matching on employment histories.
As before, it is interesting to have a closer look at which of the variables rep-
resenting rich personal information are signiﬁcant determinants of the propensity
score. In particular, it turns out that for both men and women variables relating to
family type, presence of children, and health or disability status signiﬁcantly inﬂu-
ence the probability of being treated (see Section B.1 in the Online-Appendix). In
many cases, variables describing personality information also signiﬁcantly enter the
propensity score, although ignoring this information did not make much diﬀerence
for our estimated treatment eﬀects (see step 1 of the current sensitivity analysis).
For example, information on whether there were any penalties or signs of lack of mo-
tivation mattered for both men and women in many of the cases considered. We also
investigated to what extent treatment and comparison groups were unbalanced with
respect to the personal information deﬁned above (see Section B.2 in the Online-
Appendix). It turns out that there were signiﬁcant imbalances with respect to the
second set of variables (children, family type, health etc.) for men and women in
the case of STT vs searching both in the raw data and after the imperfect matching
of step 2. This is not, or to a much lesser extent, the case for the the variables
dropped in step 1 (past penalties, lack of motivation etc.). For CFT vs searching,
the number of signiﬁcant imbalances before and after matching was low for both
groups of variables.
6.3 Sensitivity Analysis 3: Information on Other Programs
In comparison to the data used in MTG and in many other evaluation studies,
our data are also more comprehensive in another important respect: they contain
information on all possible programs a person might participate in. Hence, our
third sensitivity analysis addresses the point to what extent the information on other
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programs matters. Speciﬁcally, we compare our benchmark speciﬁcation to one that
ignores information on programs other than the one in question. This mimics the
situation in MTG who acknowledge that an unknown number of comparison group
members may have participated in other programs. In a second step, we combine
this with the MTG speciﬁcation of the propensity score.
— Figure 11 here —
The results for the comparison with a situation where no information on other
programs is available are shown in panels A and B of ﬁgure 11. The estimated
eﬀects are often pulled downwards as in ‘CFT vs searching for men in stratum 2’
and ‘STT vs searching for women in stratum 1’. The reason for this seems to be
that, if information on other programs is available, participants enrolling in the
same stratum in these other programs are not in the comparison group. Including
them in the comparison group pulls the estimated treatment eﬀects upwards to the
extent that the participants in the other programs are locked into these programs
and have low employment rates. When judging the value of this information one
should consider that the lack of information on other programs is likely less severe
for countries with a relatively low program density (such as the US) than for those
continental European countries with a high program density.
The results for step 2 (in addition, parsimonious propensity score) are shown in
panels C and D of ﬁgure 11. Here, the tendency to pull down estimated treatment
eﬀects by ignoring information about other programs is more than oﬀset by the ten-
dency to overstate treatment eﬀects if the positive selection of training participants
is not accounted for. Even if not completely generalizable to every institutional
environment, our results demonstrate that limitations in data availability may have
sizeable eﬀects on evaluation results.
6.4 Sensitivity Analysis 4: 12-Months Evaluation Window
The purpose of this section is to investigate how estimated treatment eﬀects change
when the width of the evaluation window is changed. In Section 4, we argued that
a dynamic rather than a static evaluation setup was appropriate for our applica-
tion. In the following, we deﬁne a 12-months evaluation stratum and compare its
results to those obtained in our three-strata benchmark setup.35 We expect two ef-
35For example, Wunsch and Lechner (2008) use a 18-months stratum in their main analysis and
provide results for a 12-months stratum in a sensitivity analysis. In addition, they use the method
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fects when going from our ﬁner stratiﬁcation scheme to a single 12-months window.
First, as pointed out by Fredriksson and Johansson (2008), excluding individuals
from the comparison group who receive treatment within a time window of 12-
months conditions on their future outcomes. Such future participants represent a
negative selection because they would not receive treatment in the future if they had
found employment before. Excluding them is therefore likely to pull down estimated
treatment eﬀects. Second, using a 12-months evaluation window does not account
for potential interactions between elapsed unemployment duration and covariates
as only one propensity score is estimated for the whole sample, rather than three
diﬀerent ones referring to the beginning of each stratum.
— Figure 12 here —
Figure 12 presents the comparison between the results of a 12-months evaluation
window and the results from our benchmark aggregated over the three strata used
there.36 Surprisingly, the two sets of results are rather close together. It turns
out however that this is a coincidence and the result of two countervailing eﬀects:
excluding future participants pulls down estimated treatment eﬀects, while using a
pooled instead of a stratum-speciﬁc propensity score does the opposite. Panels A, C,
and E of ﬁgure 13 show the treatment eﬀects obtained when we use our benchmark
propensity scores but exclude comparison persons who receive training at a later
point during the ﬁrst 12 months of unemployment (step 2).37 Panels B, D, and E
show the treatment eﬀects obtained when we use the pooled propensity score in
addition to excluding comparison persons who are treated within 12 months (step
3).38 As expected, excluding future participants pulls down the estimated treatment
eﬀects (step 2). The eﬀect of using pooled rather than stratum-speciﬁc propensity
scores is given by the diﬀerence between step 2 and step 3 (the two steps only diﬀer in
their use of the pooled vs the stratum-speciﬁc propensity scores). It can be seen that
using a pooled propensity score pulls up estimated treatment eﬀects considerably.39
of hypothetical program starts which is investigated in the next section.
36For the aggregated benchmark, we use the individual treatment eﬀects computed with the
stratum-speciﬁc matching procedure and aggregate them across all participants in the three strata.
37We only exclude future participants when calculating the matching weights. The propensity
scores are exactly as in the benchmark, i.e. they are estimated on samples that include participants
in later strata.
38The graphs show the case ‘STT vs searching for men’. The results for women and for CFT
are very similar, see Section E.4 in the Online-Appendix.
39We found that the correlation between the pooled propensity score and the stratum-speciﬁc
propensity scores decreased when going from earlier to later strata.
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Combining the eﬀects of excluding future participants, using a pooled propensity
score, and aggregating over strata yields the result of the 12-months evaluation
window shown in ﬁgure 12.
— Figure 13 here —
As a further sensitivity analysis related to a 12-months evaluation window, panels A
and C of ﬁgure 14 present the results of a 12-months stratum but in which we omit
matching on elapsed unemployment duration, history sequences and calendar month
of unemployment start. This drastically pulls down the estimated treatment eﬀects
because the treated individuals are to a large extent matched to comparison persons
who have already found employment. As expected, this eﬀect is much larger than
the one observed in step 5 of sensitivity analysis 1 in which we omit matching on
elapsed unemployment duration within the smaller strata considered there. Finally,
panels B and D of ﬁgure 14 show that this is exclusively due to the omission of
elapsed unemployment duration and not due to the omission of history sequences
and calendar month (the analysis in panels B and D of ﬁgure 14 still does not match
on the latter but it is already very close to the results of the original 12-months
window given in step 1 in which we match on everything).
— Figure 14 here —
6.5 Sensitivity Analysis 5: Hypothetical Program Starts
In this sensitivity analysis, we compare our benchmark estimates (aggregated over
the three strata) with the results from a 12-months evaluation window where we
align comparison units to treated units according to their hypothetical program start
(HPS). The method of hypothetical program starts is due to Lechner (1999) and is
also used, e.g., in Lechner and Wunsch (2011) and Wunsch and Lechner (2008). To
construct the hypothetical program start dates for the comparison units, we regress
the log program start dates of the treated persons on a set of covariates measured
at the beginning of unemployment. Then we use the estimated coeﬃcients plus a
draw from the empirical distribution of the residuals to predict a start date for the
nonparticipants. Nonparticipants whose predicted program start date lies after the
end of their unemployment spell are dropped. The comparison group members are
then matched based on the similarity of their hypothetical program start date with
the start dates of the participants. In addition, the program start dates enter the
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propensity score model. Similar to Wunsch and Lechner (2008), we perform kernel
matching with respect to the Mahalanobis distance of the estimated propensity score
and the program start.
Our sensitivity analysis includes three steps. In step 1, we use a 12-months stratum
in combination with the hypothetical program starts methodology where the pro-
gram starts are included as dummies in the propensity score. In addition, we exactly
match on the calendar month of unemployment start and on four-year employment
history sequences as in our benchmark. In step 2, we omit the exact matching on
calendar time and history sequences. Step 2 is closest to the scenario used in Wun-
sch and Lechner (2008). In a ﬁnal step 3, we proceed as in step 2 but include the
hypothetical program starts only linearly in the propensity score.
— Figure 15 here —
A summary of the results using the HPS methodology is shown in ﬁgure 15 (see
Section E.5 in the Online-Appendix for further results). The most conspicuous
diﬀerences to the benchmark relate to the more pronounced negative treatment ef-
fects. Qualitatively, they are much closer to those in Wunsch and Lechner (2008),
who use the same data and study similar programs, than to our benchmark.40 The
comparison of steps 1 through 3 suggests that neither matching on four-year his-
tory sequences and calendar time nor the way how the program start dates enter
the propensity score make much diﬀerence. This is conﬁrmed by further sensitiv-
ity analyses (not reported here) varying a number of further aspects of the HPS
methodology. For example, we vary the random element in the construction of the
start dates (by drawing from a diﬀerent distribution or by resetting the seed). This
made surprisingly little diﬀerence. We also impose exact matching on elapsed un-
employment duration (represented by the hypothetical start dates in the case of
comparison persons) or omit predicted start dates from the propensity score. Fi-
nally, we even change the time axis for the treatment eﬀects from counting months
since program start to counting months in unemployment. All this did not change
the estimated treatment eﬀects in a substantial way.
What explains yet the diﬀerences between the HPS results and our benchmark?
The use of a 12-months stratum implies excluding future participants, who have
disproportionately long unemployment spells, from the comparison group. This
40There are further diﬀerences that may lead to diﬀerences in estimated treatment eﬀects. For
example, Wunsch and Lechner (2008) pool men and women and consider only persons who receive
unemployment beneﬁts or unemployment assistance in the month of program start.
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tends to pull down treatment eﬀects (see step 2 of sensitivity analysis 4, panels A, C,
E of ﬁgure 13). As seen in step 3 of sensitivity analysis 4 (panels B, D, F of ﬁgure 13),
this eﬀect happens to be oﬀset by the use of a static propensity score, which tends to
pull up estimated treatment eﬀects. Our conjecture is that matching with respect to
hypothetical programs starts allows one to account for dynamic selection eﬀects in
the otherwise static setup of the 12-months stratum (which is a good thing). In the
HPS framework, treated individuals are matched with comparison group members
who have a similar hypothetical program start date. As the program start date
is predicted on the basis of observed characteristics, comparison group members
will be similar in terms of their observed characteristics to individuals who receive
treatment at a particular point in time. Thus, the downward bias from using a 12-
months window is not alleviated by the use of a static propensity score. Actually,
the HPS methodology yields even more negative eﬀects than the results obtained for
the 12-months window combined with matching on strata speciﬁc propensity scores
(sensitivity analysis 4, step 2). This suggests that there is an additional negative
shift that arises through matching on hypothetical start dates. Comparison units
that are matched to early participants appear to be highly positively selected. We see
this conﬁrmed in our data as the majority of the controls with early hypothetical
program starts exit unemployment within three months after their hypothetical
program start. Thus, the HPS methodology seems to introduce a strong interaction
between personal characteristics and unemployment experience.
6.6 Sensitivity Analysis 6: Future Program Participation
When estimating the eﬀect of treatment versus searching, the question arises to what
extent our results are determined by the fact that the comparison group includes
individuals who may participate in some program in the future (i.e. after the end of
the stratum considered). Tables 6 and 7 provide some descriptive evidence on the
incidence of later program participation in the comparison groups. Future partic-
ipants make up between 11% and 20% of the raw comparison groups (see column
‘Overall’ in table 6). Their share increases further to 15-27% when we weight the
comparison observations with their matching weights (see table 7). For example,
in the evaluation of ‘STT vs searching for men in stratum 1’, future participants
in the same or in another program represent 22.42% of the matched sample. Ta-
ble 6 further demonstrates that the incidence of future participation declines over
time because the shares in columns 3-5 remain approximately stable while the time
intervals of elapsed unemployment lengthen from three to twelve months.
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— Table 6 and table 7 here —
In the following decomposition analysis, we investigate the eﬀects of sequentially
excluding the outcomes of future participants from the pool of comparison units.
This will shed light on how including or excluding future participation inﬂuences
the results. In the ﬁrst step, we proceed as in the benchmark but exclude the
information on the outcomes of future participants from the end of their future
program onwards. In step 2 of our analysis we exclude the information on their
outcomes already from the start of their future program onwards.41 Finally, in step
3 of our analysis, we exclude future participants from the beginning of the stratum.42
Selected results from this exercise are shown in ﬁgure 16.43
First, consider the diﬀerences between step 1 and the benchmark (in which future
participants are fully included). In step 1, potentially positive post-treatment out-
comes of future participants are excluded as they are deleted from the comparison
group from the end of their future program onwards. We would expect treatment
eﬀects in step 1 to be pulled upwards compared with the benchmark estimates be-
cause future participants remain only in the comparison group so long as they have
negative outcomes. However, in panels A and B of ﬁgure 16, treatment eﬀects for
step 1 lie clearly below those obtained in the benchmark case. Thus, reducing the
weight of future participants in the control group results in a deterioration of treat-
ment eﬀects. This shows that potentially positive outcomes of future participants
are unlikely to play any important role in our analysis. It rather implies that once
we remove future participants, treated units are matched to a larger extent with
unemployed who quickly take up employment. In comparison, future participants
represent a negative selection.
Now consider the diﬀerence between step 2 (censoring at the beginning of the future
program) and step 1 (censoring at the end of the future program). Going from
step 1 to step 2 means reducing further the weight of future participants in the
comparison group. Consistent with the downwards change from the benchmark to
step 1, we now expect treatment eﬀects to be pulled down even further. Indeed,
treatment eﬀects are more negative in panels C and D of ﬁgure 16 compared with
panels A and B. Finally, step 3 completely excludes future participants from the
41A similar approach has been suggested in Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) and de Luna and
Johansson (2010).
42In this last step, we also estimate the propensity scores on samples that exclude the future
participants.
43The complete range of results can be found in Section E.6 in the Online-Appendix.
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control group. Panels E and F of ﬁgure 16 show that treatment eﬀects deteriorate
again.
To sum up, participants enrolling later during unemployment constitute a dispro-
portionately high share of the comparison group in terms of their matching weights.
Removing them pulls estimated treatment eﬀects down for two reasons. First, one
systematically deletes persons known to have relatively bad outcomes because these
people would not have received treatment later if they had already found employ-
ment again. Second, the next best matches to treated units at a given point in
time are unemployed with relatively high chances to exit to employment in the near
future.
6.7 Statistical Significance of the Sensitivity Analyses
To assess whether the diﬀerences between the benchmark and the sensitivity variants
considered by us are statistically signiﬁcant, we computed bootstrap standard errors
for selected cases, jointly resampling the benchmark and the sensitivity estimates.44
Results for the average diﬀerences between the benchmark and diﬀerent sensitivity
variants in year 1 and 2 after program start can be found in Section E.7 in the
Online Appendix. It turns out that the diﬀerences are in most cases statistically
insigniﬁcant.45 Notable exceptions are step 5 of sensitivity analysis 1 (no matching
on elapsed unemployment duration) and step 3 of sensitivity analysis 6 (completely
excluding future participants from the comparison group).
More important than whether or not diﬀerences between the benchmark and partic-
ular sensitivity variants are signiﬁcant is whether the use of a particular sensitivity
variant leads to conclusions that diﬀer substantively from those of the benchmark.
This may happen if treatment eﬀects appear statistically signiﬁcant (insigniﬁcant)
in the sensitivity variant but insigniﬁcant (signiﬁcant) in the benchmark. As we
report in Section E.7 in the Online-Appendix, in a number of sensitivity cases the
substantive conclusions would diﬀer from the benchmark, e.g. in step 5 of sensitiv-
ity analysis 1 (no matching on elapsed unemployment duration), in steps 2 and 4 of
sensitivity analysis 2 (rich personal information), and in steps 2 and 3 of sensitivity
44We implemented a semiparametric bootstrap where we resampled persons from the combined
samples of the benchmark and the sensitivity variants and repeated the matching analysis in every
resample with a draw from the asymptotic distribution of the coeﬃcients in the propensity score.
We compared this procedure to that of the purely nonparametric bootstrap that we used for our
benchmark estimates for all cases and found virtually no diﬀerences.
45This is also the general ﬁnding in Lechner and Wunsch (2011) in the part of the analysis that
is comparable to ours.
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analysis 6 (future program participation). Note that even if the diﬀerence between
the benchmark and a given sensitivity variant is not signiﬁcant in the vast majority
of cases, it is still informative about the direction of possible biases and changes in
the conclusions based on standard tests of signiﬁcance of treatment eﬀects.
7 Summary and Conclusions
This paper analyzes and compares the employment and earnings eﬀects of two im-
portant types of public sponsored training in West Germany in the early 2000s:
short-term training and classroom further training. In light of recent policy reforms
fostering shorter training programs, we are particularly interested in the question of
how short-term training programs compare in terms of eﬀectiveness to traditional
longer-term further training schemes. Another goal of our analysis is to investigate
to what extent data features and methodological choices inﬂuence the evaluation
results.
Our impact estimates suggest that the eﬀectiveness of the diﬀerent programs
strongly depends on the gender of the participants and the timing of program partic-
ipation during unemployment. We ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant positive employment
eﬀects for male and female participants in short-term training and classroom fur-
ther training who started their training not too early during their unemployment
spell. According to our results, both short-term and classroom further training may
increase the employment rate of the participants by some 5 to 10 percentage points
for men and by an even larger amount for women. Although both types of training
programs generate signiﬁcant earnings gains in the cases in which there are also
positive employment eﬀects, earnings gains induced by classroom further training
attain e200 per month and are generally larger than those of short-term training
(e70 per month for men and e175 for women). The somewhat surprising eﬀec-
tiveness of short-term training regarding employment is also conﬁrmed in pairwise
comparisons to classroom further training. While our results suggest some hetero-
geneity in the eﬀects for diﬀerent subpopulations, we could not detect further eﬀect
heterogeneity regarding the personal characteristics of participants. Part of the ex-
planation why positive treatment eﬀects are more likely for women and people with
longer unemployment durations may be that training programs have an ‘attachment
eﬀect’, i.e. nonparticipants are more likely to permanently leave the labor market
than participants.
Given that short-term and classroom further training show somewhat comparable
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employment gains but classroom further training is more eﬀective in terms of earn-
ings, it is not entirely clear whether the policy shift that took place in 2002 and that
largely replaced longer-term training courses with inexpensive short-term courses
was justiﬁed. One has to keep in mind however, that short-term training programs
are (due to their much shorter durations) associated with much shorter lock-in pe-
riods and considerably lower total costs. Although we lack detailed information on
training costs, the results in table 3 combined with the information on average costs
in table 1 suggest that an average short-term training course costing only e627 may
lead to a long-term employment gain comparable to that of an average further train-
ing course costing e6,175. In the short run, longer-term training is dominated by
short-term training because of the longer lock-in period associated with longer-term
programs. Although a general cost-beneﬁt analysis seems diﬃcult, simple calcula-
tions raise some doubts whether the more expensive longer-term programs can be
cost-eﬀective. Considering a period of ﬁve years and even ignoring the lock-in eﬀect
during the ﬁrst year, providing longer-term further training to 100 unemployed in-
dividuals would cost some e617,500 (compared to e62,700 in the case of short-term
training). Assuming a positive employment eﬀect of plus 10 percentage points, this
would bring on average 10 out of the 100 unemployed back into employment, saving
some 10 × e1200 × 12 (months) × 4 (years) = e576,000 in unemployment com-
pensation the Federal Employment Agency would have to pay otherwise (based on
a monthly unemployment beneﬁt level of e1200, see table 1). Note that in many
cases, employment eﬀects are smaller or even zero. Even if earnings gains are taken
into account, it will take a rather long time before longer-term further training pro-
grams amortize their costs. By comparison, the picture looks more positive in the
case of short-term training.46
Looking at the particular purpose of short-term training analyzed here – proﬁling,
job search assistance, and monitoring – it seems plausible that these programs do
indeed help to activate participants who otherwise do not look as intensively for new
jobs. Our results are therefore in line with a number of recent studies that document
positive eﬀects of increased job-search assistance and activation, see e.g. Blundell et
al. (2004), Weber and Hofer (2004), Crépon et al. (2005), Fougère et al. (2005), Hujer
et al. (2005, 2006), and van den Berg and van der Klaauw (2006), and Fitzenberger
et al. (2012). As a qualiﬁcation, the post-treatment observation period in our study
is rather limited, covering about two and a half years after program start. Studies
considering longer time horizons often ﬁnd that, over the longer run, the balance
46Note that the framework used by us stresses the possibility that individuals who do not receive
treatment now may receive it in the future. A proper cost-beneﬁt analysis would have to take this
point into consideration.
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shifts in favor of the longer-term training programs, see e.g. Hotz et al. (2006),
Lechner et al. (2011), and Osikominu (2012). Further, our study does not account
for potential general equilibrium eﬀects (Calmfors (1994)). The limited available
evidence (e.g. Boone and van Ours (2009), Crépon et al. (2011), and Speckesser
(2004)), does not suggest, however, that there are adverse macroeconomic eﬀects of
job-search assistance and training programs.
The second contribution of our paper is a careful sensitivity analysis examining
to what extent data features and methodological choices inﬂuence our evaluation
results. Each time starting from our benchmark speciﬁcation, we conduct six sets of
sensitivity analyses, three relating to data features and three relating to choices of
evaluation methodology. Our sensitivity analysis conveys useful information about
the adequate design of evaluation studies for similar settings as ours.
In our ﬁrst sensitivity analysis, we show that ﬂexibly conditioning on possibly remote
details of the employment history before the current unemployment spell makes lit-
tle diﬀerence to our estimated treatment eﬀects. On the one hand, this may reﬂect
the fact that we already condition on some aspects of recent prior employment when
constructing our evaluation samples. On the other hand, this may be due to the
richness of our data along other dimensions, substituting the detailed employment
history. More importantly, we ﬁnd that not conditioning on the exact unemploy-
ment experience in the current spell typically changes estimated treatment eﬀects to
a large extent because not taking account of this information results in incorrectly
matching treated individuals with comparison persons who have already found em-
ployment again.
In our second sensitivity analysis, we ﬁnd that excluding information on the per-
sonality and conduct during past unemployment spells, such as whether there were
signs of a lack of motivation, past beneﬁt sanctions or past program dropout, does
not aﬀect estimated treatment eﬀects. Rather, rich information on household type,
number and age of dependent children, marital status, health, disability, and reasons
why the last job ended is highly important in order to balance treatment and com-
parison groups. We also show that using all the available covariate information but
without investing in a detailed speciﬁcation search does not change the estimated
treatment eﬀects by much. Further, we compare our benchmark estimates to results
we would get if we had the same kind of information as standard state-of-the-art
evaluations such as Mueser et al. (2007). Reducing the information to a set of basic
demographic covariates may make a considerable diﬀerence. In our application, the
resulting diﬀerences are often as large as if we did not match on the propensity score
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altogether.
In our third sensitivity analysis, we address the important point that in many eval-
uation studies, information on participation in programs other than the one under
consideration is not available. In our case, this often leads to strong biases in the
estimated eﬀects of training programs. In general, this issue may be less relevant
for countries such as the US in which the density of programs is low.
Our fourth, ﬁfth and sixth sensitivity analyses investigate the consequences of diﬀer-
ent methodological choices. In our benchmark model, we compare persons receiving
treatment after a given unemployment experience to persons not yet treated, simi-
lar to Sianesi (2004). We stratify program participations into three strata: program
start between months 1-3, 4-6, and 7-12 of unemployment. We impose that poten-
tial comparison units have the same elapsed unemployment duration as the treated
unit under consideration in the month before the program starts and match on
strata-speciﬁc propensity scores.
In our fourth sensitivity analysis, we show that using a wide 12-months evaluation
window rather than three narrower strata implies two diﬀerent eﬀects. First, such an
evaluation window misses interactions between personal characteristics and elapsed
unemployment in shaping the probability to receive treatment over time. Second,
widening the evaluation window entails that participants enrolling several months
later are excluded from the comparison group. This means that the importance
of ‘conditioning on future outcomes’ increases because persons are systematically
removed from the comparison group who remain unemployed long enough to receive
treatment several months in the future. We ﬁnd that excluding future participants
pulls down estimated treatment eﬀects and may thus bias the assessment of how
eﬀective a program is. Not conditioning on elapsed unemployment duration has
even more drastic consequences in a 12-months evaluation window than with the
three narrow ones.
In our ﬁfth sensitivity analysis, we examine the consequences of using diﬀerent
methods to align treated and comparison units in their elapsed unemployment ex-
perience. The alternative method of hypothetical program starts (HPS) uses a
regression of start dates on personal characteristics in the treated sample to predict
hypothetical program starts for the nonparticipants. It then matches treated and
comparison units based on the similarity of their start dates and a static propensity
score obtained using a 12-months evaluation window. Compared with our bench-
mark estimates the HPS methodology yields substantially more negative treatment
eﬀects. To some extent this is due to the use of a 12-months evaluation window that
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excludes future participants from the comparison group. In addition, the match-
ing on hypothetical program starts entails that participants tend to be matched to
nonparticipants who take up employment shortly after their predicted start date.
These ﬁndings are important because they show that evaluation results may depend
strongly on the kind of evaluation method used.
Our sixth sensitivity analysis addresses in more detail the consequences of excluding
future participants from the comparison group. Doing so may bias estimated treat-
ment eﬀects downwards because members of the comparison group who are known
to have bad outcomes (otherwise these individuals would not receive future treat-
ment) are systematically excluded. In our application, future participants make up
roughly 20% of the matching weights in the comparison group. Reducing their share
pulls estimated treatment eﬀects down as treated units now tend to be matched with
positively selected nonparticipants who take up a job shortly. Our results are im-
portant as they highlight the diﬀerences between ‘dynamic’ approaches in the spirit
of Sianesi (2004) and Fredriksson and Johansson (2008) and standard approaches
modeled on the static setup of a random experiment. On the one hand, the treat-
ment eﬀects identiﬁed in the Sianesi approach diﬀer in a substantive way from those
of an ‘experimental’ estimator where participants in future programs do not exist.
Our dynamic impact estimates measure the eﬀect of the caseworker’s decision to
assign a job-seeker to a program now rather than to continue job search and recon-
sider her for treatment at a later point in time. On the other hand, excluding future
program participants from the comparison group in order to get close to the ideal
of measuring a pure ‘experimental’ eﬀect implies conditioning on future outcomes.
Our sensitivity analyses suggest that this eﬀect is empirically relevant when future
program participations are quantitatively important as in our setting. The diﬀer-
ences between the two approaches should be less critical if the program density is
low.
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Figure 1: Active Labor Market Programs in Germany
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‘Retraining’ in the text.
Figure 2: Distribution of Program Durations in the Evaluation Sample
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Figure 3: Employment Eﬀects for STT vs Searching
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Note.— Diﬀerence in employment rates is measured on the ordinate, pre-unemployment (< 0) and
post-treatment (≥ 0) months and years on the abscissa. Dotted lines are pointwise 95% bootstrap
conﬁdence intervals. Stratum 1 denotes entry into program during months 1 to 3 of unemployment,
stratum 2 during months 4 to 6, and stratum 3 during months 7 to 12.
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Figure 4: Earnings Eﬀects for STT vs Searching
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Note.—The abscissae measures pre-unemployment (< 0) and post-treatment (≥ 0) months and
years. The diﬀerence in average real earnings (in Euro, reference year 2000) during the correspond-
ing time interval is given on the ordinate. Dotted lines are pointwise 95% bootstrap conﬁdence
intervals. Stratum 1 denotes entry into program during months 1 to 3 of unemployment, stratum
2 during months 4 to 6, and stratum 3 during months 7 to 12.
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Figure 5: Employment Eﬀects for CFT vs Searching
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Note.—Diﬀerence in employment rates is measured on the ordinate, pre-unemployment (< 0) and
post-treatment (≥ 0) months and years on the abscissa. Dotted lines are pointwise 95% bootstrap
conﬁdence intervals. Stratum 1 denotes entry into program during months 1 to 3 of unemployment,
stratum 2 during months 4 to 6, and stratum 3 during months 7 to 12.
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Figure 6: Earnings Eﬀects for CFT vs Searching
(A) (B)
−
60
0
−
40
0
−
20
0
0
20
0
40
0
−7 y
−4 y
−1 y
0 m
6 m
12 m
18 m
24 m
30 m
CFT vs Searching, Males, Stratum 1
−
40
0
−
20
0
0
20
0
40
0
−7 y
−4 y
−1 y
0 m
6 m
12 m
18 m
24 m
30 m
CFT vs Searching, Females, Stratum 1
(C) (D)
−
60
0
−
40
0
−
20
0
0
20
0
40
0
−7 y
−4 y
−1 y
0 m
6 m
12 m
18 m
24 m
30 m
CFT vs Searching, Males, Stratum 2
−
40
0
−
20
0
0
20
0
40
0
−7 y
−4 y
−1 y
0 m
6 m
12 m
18 m
24 m
30 m
CFT vs Searching, Females, Stratum 2
(E) (F)
−
40
0
−
20
0
0
20
0
40
0
−7 y
−4 y
−1 y
0 m
6 m
12 m
18 m
24 m
30 m
CFT vs Searching, Males, Stratum 3
−
40
0
−
20
0
0
20
0
40
0
−7 y
−4 y
−1 y
0 m
6 m
12 m
18 m
24 m
30 m
CFT vs Searching, Females, Stratum 3
Note.—The abscissae measures pre-unemployment (< 0) and post-treatment (≥ 0) months and
years. The diﬀerence in average real earnings (in Euro, reference year 2000) during the correspond-
ing time interval is given on the ordinate. Dotted lines are pointwise 95% bootstrap conﬁdence
intervals. Stratum 1 denotes entry into program during months 1 to 3 of unemployment, stratum
2 during months 4 to 6, and stratum 3 during months 7 to 12.
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Figure 7: Sensitivity Analysis 1: Employment History
Step 1: No exact matching on employment histories
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Step 2: In addition, no history sequence dummies in propensity score
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Step 3: In addition, the seven-year history information is dropped from in propensity score
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Note.—The bold line refers to the alternative speciﬁcation. The thin line and the dotted conﬁdence
bands refer to the benchmark speciﬁcation (see ﬁgures 3 and 5).
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Figure 8: Sensitivity Analysis 1: Employment History, continued
Step 4: In addition, everything related to beneﬁt information dropped
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Step 5: Benchmark but without exact matching on unemployment duration within strata
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Note.—The bold line refers to the alternative speciﬁcation. The thin line and the conﬁdence
interval refers to the benchmark speciﬁcation (see ﬁgures 3 and 5).
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Figure 9: Sensitivity Analysis 2: Rich Personal Information
Step 1: No personality variables
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Step 2: In addition, no rich personal information
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Step 3: No detailed speciﬁcation search
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Note.—The bold line refers to the alternative speciﬁcation. The thin line and the conﬁdence
interval refers to the benchmark speciﬁcation (see ﬁgures 3 and 5).
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Figure 10: Sensitivity Analysis 2: Rich Personal Information, continued
Step 4: Comparison with speciﬁcation similar to MTG
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Step 5: No propensity score matching
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Step 6: No propensity score matching and no exact history matching
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Note.—The bold line refers to the alternative speciﬁcation. The thin line and the conﬁdence
interval refers to the benchmark speciﬁcation (see ﬁgures 3 and 5).
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Figure 11: Sensitivity Analysis 3: Information on Other Programs
Step 1: Omitting information on other programs
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Step 2: Omitting information on other programs, MTG speciﬁcation
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Note.—The bold line refers to the alternative speciﬁcation. The thin line and the conﬁdence
interval refers to the benchmark speciﬁcation (see ﬁgures 3 and 5).
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Figure 12: Sensitivity Analysis 4: 12-Months Evaluation Window
Step 1: 12-months evaluation window compared to benchmark aggregated over its three strata
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Note.—The bold line refers to the alternative speciﬁcation. The thin line and the conﬁdence
interval refers to the benchmark speciﬁcation (see ﬁgures 3 and 5).
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Figure 13: Sensitivity Analysis 4: 12-Months Evaluation Window, continued (1)
Step 2: Strata speciﬁc propensity scores
and exclusion of participants within 12
months (panels A, C, E)
Step 3: Pooled propensity score and
exclusion of participants within 12
months (panels B, D, F)
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Note.—The bold line refers to the alternative speciﬁcation. The thin line and the conﬁdence
interval refers to the benchmark speciﬁcation (see ﬁgures 3 and 5).
68
Figure 14: Sensitivity Analysis 4: 12-Months Evaluation Window, continued (2)
Step 4: 12-months evaluation window
without matching on unemployment
duration (panels A, C)
Step 5: 12-months evaluation window
with matching on unemployment
duration (panels B, D)
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Note.—The bold line refers to the alternative speciﬁcation. The thin line and the conﬁdence
interval refers to the benchmark speciﬁcation (see ﬁgures 3 and 5).
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Figure 15: Sensitivity Analysis 5: Hypothetical Program Starts (HPS)
Step 1: HPS included as dummies
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Step 2: HPS as dummies, no extra matching on history/calendar month
(C) (D)
−
.
1
−
.
05
0
.
05
.
1
−7 y
−6 y
−5 y
−4 y
−3 y
−
 2y
−1 y
−6 m
−5 m
−4 m
−3 m
0 m
6 m
12 m
18 m
24 m
STT vs Searching, Males, Stratum 1
−
.
4
−
.
3
−
.
2
−
.
1
0
.
1
−7 y
−6 y
−5 y
−4 y
−3 y
−
 2y
−1 y
−6 m
−5 m
−4 m
−3 m
0 m
6 m
12 m
18 m
24 m
CFT vs Searching, Males, Stratum 1
Step 3: HPS linearly, no extra matching on history/calendar month
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Note.—The bold line refers to the alternative speciﬁcation. The thin line and the conﬁdence
interval refers to the benchmark speciﬁcation (see ﬁgures 3 and 5).
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Figure 16: Sensitivity Analysis 6: Future Program Participation
Step 1: Exclusion from end of future program
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Step 2: Exclusion from start of future program
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Step 3: Complete exclusion
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Note.—The bold line refers to the alternative speciﬁcation. The thin line and the conﬁdence
interval refers to the benchmark speciﬁcation (see ﬁgures 3 and 5).
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Tables
Table 1: Average Expenditures on Training and Unemployment Compensation and
Average Training Durations in Germany
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Short-Term Training
Enrollment length 1.2 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.9
Training costs 580 570 658 538 421
Further Training and Retraining
Enrollment length 8.2 9.3 9.1 10.5 10.7
Training costs 664 664 681 631 627
Subsistence allowance 1,152 1,178 1,188 1,156 1,150
Unemployment Compensation
Unemployment beneﬁts 1,160 1,189 1,185 1,261 1,313
Unemployment assistance 753 721 727 691 713
Source.—Bundesagentur für Arbeit (2001,2002a-2005a), own calculations. Note.—Rows labeled
‘Enrollment Length’ display the average duration of the program in months. Rows labeled ‘Train-
ing Costs’, ‘Subsistence Allowance’ and rows under the heading ‘Unemployment Compensation’
contain the average monthly expenditures (in e) divided by the average monthly number of partic-
ipants/claimants. Expenditures on subsistence allowance, unemployment beneﬁts and unemploy-
ment assistance include social security contributions.
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Table 2: Sample Sizes, Program Participation, and Transitions by Stratum
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
Males
Unemployed at start of stratum 32,172 20,335 13,241
Short-term training 912 547 662
Classroom further training 389 251 270
Practical further training 86 71 107
Retraining 263 89 99
Other program 1,171 648 755
No program participation 29,351 18,729 11,348
– Exit to employment 9,016 5,488 3,113
– Unemployed until end of stratum 20,335 13,241 8,235
Females
Unemployed at start of stratum 20,746 13,800 10,096
Short-term training 693 409 497
Classroom further training 344 194 201
Practical further training 88 61 85
Retraining 262 55 72
Other program 671 332 446
No program participation 18,409 12,749 8,795
– Exit to employment 4,609 2,653 1,939
– Unemployed until end of stratum 13,800 10,096 6,856
Note.—Stratum 1 refers to months 1-3 of unemployment, stratum 2 to months 4-6 and stratum
3 to months 7-12. The ﬁrst row shows the number of people who are still unemployed at the
beginning of the stratum and who have not received a program before. The subsequent rows show
their transitions into programs and employment and the survivors in unemployment until the end
of the stratum.
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Table 3: Average Monthly Treatment Eﬀects on the Treated – Employment
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 Year 2
Men
STT vs Searching -0.002 (0.013) 0.010 (0.016) 0.019 (0.017) 0.034 (0.020)∗ 0.030 (0.015)∗∗ 0.046 (0.018)∗∗
STT vs CFT 0.163 (0.024)∗∗∗ 0.021 (0.038) 0.173 (0.024)∗∗∗ 0.062 (0.041) 0.149 (0.018)∗∗∗ 0.057 (0.035)
CFT vs Searching -0.190 (0.018)∗∗∗ -0.019 (0.026) -0.113 (0.023)∗∗∗ 0.015 (0.032) -0.078 (0.017)∗∗∗ 0.084 (0.032)∗∗∗
CFT vs STT -0.120 (0.027)∗∗∗ 0.028 (0.037) -0.100 (0.034)∗∗∗ -0.026 (0.047) -0.061 (0.028)∗∗ 0.076 (0.044)∗
Women
STT vs Searching 0.008 (0.016) 0.037 (0.018)∗∗ 0.053 (0.019)∗∗∗ 0.096 (0.025)∗∗∗ 0.050 (0.021)∗∗ 0.128 (0.025)∗∗∗
STT vs CFT 0.143 (0.022)∗∗∗ 0 (0.041) 0.194 (0.027)∗∗∗ 0.021 (0.056) 0.137 (0.023)∗∗∗ 0.067 (0.047)
CFT vs Searching -0.134 (0.022)∗∗∗ 0.060 (0.031)∗ -0.132 (0.029)∗∗∗ 0.063 (0.046) -0.087 (0.027)∗∗∗ 0.070 (0.038)∗
CFT vs STT -0.141 (0.028)∗∗∗ -0.011 (0.040) -0.161 (0.036)∗∗∗ -0.012 (0.053) -0.100 (0.038)∗∗∗ -0.071 (0.054)
Note.—Stratum 1, 2, 3 refer to programs starting in months 1-3, 4-6, 7-12 of unemployment. Columns labeled ‘Year 1’ refer to the average of the monthly
treatment eﬀects across the ﬁrst twelve months since program start, columns labeled ‘Year 2’ to the average of the monthly treatment eﬀects during the
second year since program start. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%-, 5%-
and 1%- level, respectively.
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Table 4: Average Monthly Treatment Eﬀects on the Treated – Earnings
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 Year 2 Year 1 Year 2
Men
STT vs Searching -30.382 (30.723) 4.693 (37.668) -2.509 (34.285) 47.598 (46.249) 42.626 (30.476) 86.533 (40.003)∗∗
STT vs CFT 314.914 (54.905)∗∗∗ -55.558 (97.928) 300.415 (63.698)∗∗∗ 160.484 (92.818)∗ 279.830 (37.369)∗∗∗ 123.143 (70.515)∗
CFT vs Searching -424.437 (51.135)∗∗∗ 6.675 (72.886) -250.291 (58.449)∗∗∗ -17.567 (81.542) -175.549 (38.039)∗∗∗ 179.112 (70.706)∗∗
CFT vs STT -269.484 (59.720)∗∗∗ 139.711 (91.966) -193.397 (75.756)∗∗ -142.781 (111.560) -78.360 (56.994) 220.078 (99.181)∗∗
Women
STT vs Searching 28.555 (30.098) 86.124 (38.009)∗∗ 76.040 (33.035)∗∗ 163.312 (45.979)∗∗∗ 46.941 (31.321) 174.039 (40.091)∗∗∗
STT vs CFT 257.059 (40.874)∗∗∗ -30.683 (83.324) 307.633 (46.511)∗∗∗ 34.625 (102.059) 177.653 (36.686)∗∗∗ 54.631 (79.961)
CFT vs Searching -190.229 (45.236)∗∗∗ 193.081 (65.128)∗∗∗ -220.986 (53.101)∗∗∗ 123.872 (88.116) -128.160 (45.702)∗∗∗ 148.351 (69.050)∗∗
CFT vs STT -250.685 (59.480)∗∗∗ -2.396 (85.558) -250.348 (63.550)∗∗∗ 4.981 (101.255) -107.283 (57.787)∗ -11.134 (97.949)
Note.—Stratum 1, 2, 3 refer to programs starting in months 1-3, 4-6, 7-12 of unemployment. Columns labeled ‘Year 1’ refer to the average of the monthly
treatment eﬀects across the ﬁrst twelve months since program start, columns labeled ‘Year 2’ to the average of the monthly treatment eﬀects during the
second year since program start. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 250 replications in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10%-, 5%-
and 1%- level, respectively.
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Table 5: Results of Outcome Regressions on Treatment Dummy, Personal Charac-
teristics and Interactions
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
STT, Males
χ2-Stat. (p-Value) 14.95 (0.780) 22.02 (0.339) 19.75 (0.473)
Corr. ATT with CI 0.005 [-.021, .030] 0.025 [-.009, .060] 0.037 [.007, .067]
Uncorr. ATT (SE) 0.004 (0.013) 0.026 (0.017) 0.037 (0.015)
STT, Females
χ2-Stat. (p-Value) 23.81 (0.251) 16.02 (0.715) 20.38 (0.434)
Corr. ATT with CI 0.021 [-.010, .052] 0.073 [.033, .112] 0.089 [.047, .131]
Uncorr. ATT (SE) 0.023 (0.016) 0.074 (0.020)∗∗∗ 0.088 (0.021)∗∗∗
CFT, Males
χ2-Stat. (p-Value) 16.22 (0.703) 26.43 (0.152) 15.51 (0.747)
Corr. ATT with CI -0.109 [-.148, -.070] -0.054 [-.100, -.007] -0.006 [-.050, .038]
Uncorr. ATT (SE) -0.104 (0.019)∗∗∗ -0.050 (0.025)∗∗ 0.002 (0.022)
CFT, Females
χ2-Stat. (p-Value) 8.10 (0.991) 21.96 (0.343) 15.64 (0.739)
Corr. ATT with CI -0.038 [-.086, .010] -0.036 [-.102, .031] -0.016 [-.075, .042]
Uncorr. ATT (SE) -0.036 (0.024) -0.035 (0.033) -0.010 (0.029)
Note.—Stratum 1, 2, 3 refer to programs starting in months 1-3, 4-6, 7-12 of unemployment. The
table summarizes the main results from a regression of the average treatment eﬀect on the treated
(ATT) averaged over the ﬁrst 24 months after treatment start on the treatment dummy, a set of
personal characteristics and interactions of the treatment dummy and the personal characteristics,
see equation (4). Rows labeled ‘χ2-Stat. (p-Val.)’ show the test statistic (p-value) of a Wald-test
of joint signiﬁcance involving the interactions with the treatment dummy (H0 : δ = 0 in eq. (4)).
Rows labeled ‘Corr. ATT with CI’ show the coeﬃcient on the treatment dummy (γ in eq. (4))
that corresponds to the estimated mismatch corrected ATT and its conﬁdence interval (CI). For
comparison the ATT without regression correction and its standard error are shown in the rows
labeled ‘Uncorrected ATT’. ∗∗∗ denotes statistically signiﬁcant at 1 %, ∗∗ at 5 %, ∗ at 10 %. All
inference is based on 250 bootstrap resamples. For additional results on eﬀect heterogeneity, see
Section D in the Online-Appendix.
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Table 6: Importance of Later Program Participations
Total Number Share of Future Participants (%)
of Controls
Overall
By Time Period By Program Type
Month 4-6 Month 7-12 Year 2 STT CFT Other
Males
Stratum 1 29,351 17.89 5.47 6.44 5.97 6.35 2.33 9.21
Stratum 2 18,729 19.46 – 10.10 9.36 7.04 2.30 10.12
Stratum 3 11,348 15.45 – – 15.45 5.78 1.39 8.28
Females
Stratum 1 18,409 17.92 5.69 7.07 5.16 6.98 2.90 8.04
Stratum 2 12,749 17.65 – 10.20 7.44 6.89 2.66 8.10
Stratum 3 8,795 10.79 – – 10.79 4.38 1.55 4.86
Note.—Stratum 1, 2, 3 refer to programs starting in months 1-3, 4-6, 7-12 of unemployment. All numbers refer to program vs searching comparisons.
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Table 7: Percentage of Later Program Participation in Terms of Matching Weights
Males Females
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3 Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
STT vs Searching 22.42 24.58 20.36 20.69 27.36 22.01
CFT vs Searching 21.65 22.02 15.33 19.83 24.41 16.52
Note.—Stratum 1, 2, 3 refer to programs starting in months 1-3, 4-6, 7-12 of unemployment. Shares
are measured in % of all potential comparison units (see column 1, table 6).
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